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THRESHOLDS QUANTIFYING PROPORTIONALITY
CRITERIA FOR ELECTION METHODS
SVANTE JANSON
Abstract. We define several different thresholds for election methods
by considering different scenarios, corresponding to different proportion-
ality criteria that have been proposed by various authors. In particular,
we reformulate the criteria known as DPC, PSC, JR, PJR, EJR in our
setting. We consider multi-winner election methods of different types,
using ballots with unordered lists of candidates or ordered lists, and for
comparison also methods using only party lists. The thresholds are cal-
culated for many different election methods. The considered methods
include classical ones such as BV, SNTV and STV (with some results
going back to e.g. Droop and Dodgson in the 19th century); we also
study in detail several perhaps lesser known methods by Phragme´n and
Thiele. There are also many cases left as open problems.
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1. Introduction
We consider election methods where a number of persons are elected from
some set of candidates. For example, this is the case in a multi-member
constituency in a parliamentary election or a local election, but also in many
other situations such as electing a board or a committee in an organization.
We will here use the language of a parliamentary election; some other authors
instead talk about e.g. committee voting rules. We assume throughout that
the number of seats, i.e., the number of elected representatives, is given in
advance; we denote the number of seats by S.
Many different election methods have been suggested for this type of
elections, and many of them are, or have been, used somewhere. For some
important examples and discussions, from both mathematical and political
aspects, see e.g. [17; 35; 36]; for the election methods actually used at present
in parliamentary elections around the world, see [21]; see also my surveys
[22] (in Swedish) and [24, Appendix E].
One important aspect of election methods is whether they are proportional
or not, i.e., whether different groups of voters (parties) get numbers of seats
that are (more or less) proportional to their numbers of votes. Whether an
election method is proportional or not is not precisely defined, even when
there are formal parties. Obviously, there are necessarily deviations from
exact proportionality since the number of seats is an integer for each party.
Moreover, in practice, whether the outcome of an election is (approxima-
tively) proportional depends not only on the method, but also on the num-
ber of seats in the constituency, and on other factors such as the number of
parties and their sizes.
One way that has been used by many authors to study proportionality
of election methods theoretically is to formulate some criterion, which is
supposed to be a desirable requirement for a method to be regarded as
proportional, and then investigate whether a particular method satisfies this
criterion or not. A typical example is the Droop Proportionality Criterion
(DPC) byWoodall [46] (see also Dummett [14, p. 283]); this is formulated for
STV type elections where each ballot contains a ranked list of candidates,
THRESHOLDS FOR ELECTION METHODS 3
i.e., election methods with ordered ballots in the notation introduced in
Section 2.
Droop Proportionality Criterion. If V votes are cast in an election
to fill S seats, and, for some whole numbers ℓ and m satisfying 0 < ℓ 6 m,
more than ℓ · V/(S + 1) voters put the same m candidates (not necessarily
in the same order) as the top m candidates in their preference listings, then
at least ℓ of those m candidates should be elected. (In the event of a tie,
this should be interpreted as saying that every outcome that is chosen with
non-zero probability should include at least ℓ of these m candidates.)
A related criterion is Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC) [44],
which differs from the DPC above only in that “more than ℓV/(S + 1)
voters” is replaced by “at least ℓV/S voters”.1 See further Section 8.
Further examples of similar proportionality criteria are JR, PJR and EJR
discussed in Section 6.
Several authors study such criteria and whether specific elections methods
satisfy them or not; for example, Woodall [46] points out that any version of
STV (Single Transferable Vote) satisfies the DPC above, at least provided
the Droop quota V/(S + 1) is used without rounding. See Section 8.2
The purpose of the present paper is to promote an alternative and more
quantitative, but closely related, way of studying such proportionality prop-
erties. Instead of, as in DPC and PSC above, fixing a number of voters and
asking whether a set of voters of this size always can get at least ℓ candi-
dates elected (under certain assumptions on how these voters vote), we turn
the question around and ask how large a set of voters has to be in order to
be guaranteed to get at least ℓ candidates elected (again under certain as-
sumptions on how they vote). Corresponding to the DPC and PSC criteria
above, we thus define, for a given election method, the threshold πPSC(ℓ, S)
as the minimum (or rather infimum) fraction of votes that guarantees at
least ℓ elected out of S under the conditions above, see Section 8 for details.
The DPC criterion then can be formulated as πPSC(ℓ, S) 6 ℓ/(S + 1) (for
all S > 1 and ℓ 6 S), and the PSC criterion as πPSC(ℓ, S) < ℓ/S (ignoring
a possible minor problem in the case of ties, see further Remark 2.8).
An advantage of this quantitative version of proportionality criteria is thus
that it treats both DPC and PSC at once. Moreover, it is not necessary to
consider only the thresholds ℓ/(S + 1) and ℓ/S. In fact, Aziz and Lee [2]
have defined a property q-PSC, where the conclusion above is supposed to
hold for every set of at least qℓ voters; with q = κV this is thus the same as
πPSC(ℓ, S) < ℓκ. Thus, to consider this parametric family of proportionality
criteria is equivalent to considering the quantity πPSC. As another example,
1The formulation of the PSC in [44] is somewhat different, but is easily seen to be
equivalent to our version; cf. “Theorem” 3.9.
2 Recall that there are many versions of STV, see Appendix A.3.1; recall also that
in many versions, the Droop quota is rounded to an integer, which may lead to minor
violations of the DPC as stated above.
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note that the property majority in [46] in our notation can be written as
πPSC(1, S) 6 1/2.
Another advantage of the quantitative version is that it enables us to see
not only whether a criterion hold or not, but also how badly it fails if it does.
Conversely, if a criterion holds, perhaps it turns out that it holds with some
marginal. A threshold such as πPSC therefore gives more information, and
may give more insight in the behaviour of an election method. Furthermore,
even if the goal is to study a specific criterion, the arithmetic of the thresh-
olds may simplify or clarify proofs. (See e.g. Remark 7.33 and Example 7.40
for examples of this.)
We have here used DPC and PSC as examples only. Much of our work
below deals with other similar properties, and we will define a number of
thresholds π(ℓ, S) for different scenarios.
Our point of view is far from new. In fact, thresholds of the type π(ℓ, S)
figure prominently in the 19th century discussion on parliamentary reform
in (for example) Britain, e.g. in Droop [13] and Dodgson [12]; for party
list systems, they were defined by Rae, Hanby and Loosemore [38], [37]
under the name threshold of exclusion, see also Lijphart and Gibberd [28].
Nevertheless, the idea is still useful and seems to deserve further attention; in
the present paper we extend the study of such thresholds to further scenarios
and further election methods.
We consider many different election methods. These include several clas-
sical ones such as D’Hondt’s method, Sainte-Lague¨’s method, Block Vote,
Limited Vote, SNTV and STV; we also study, in a rather large part of
the paper, several election methods by Phragme´n and Thiele. (Neverthe-
less, many election methods remain to be studied.) We partly survey know
results, but most of the results seem to be new.
Remark 1.1. In the present paper, we aim at computing π(ℓ, S) in many
cases, but we do not try to give any criteria for what is good and what is
not. Nevertheless, note that historically, the two main thresholds that have
been proposed for various scenarios are ℓ/S and ℓ/(S + 1); in other words
that the required number of votesW to guarantee ℓ seats is ℓ times the Hare
quota V/S or the Droop quota V/(S + 1), which both have been put forth
as a natural number of votes deserving a seat. The Hare quota is simpler
and perhaps more intuitive; see e.g. “Theorem” 3.9 below; the Droop quota
was proposed by Droop [13] based on the argument that if a candidate has
more than 1/(S+1) of the votes, then there cannot be S others with at least
as many votes, so the candidate ought to be among the S elected;3 see also
[12] and [44]. In our context, ℓ/(S +1) is essentially the best (i.e., smallest)
threshold that can be achieved, see Remark 3.6; hence π(ℓ, S) = ℓ/(S + 1)
can be regarded as the optimal value. We will see many cases where this
3This argument holds for e.g. SNTV (Appendix A.2.3) and Cumulative Vote (Appen-
dix A.2.5; the case really discussed by Droop [13]).
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value is achieved, and many where it is not. (See Table 2 in Appendix B for
some numerical values.)
2. Notations and general definitions
We consider only election methods where each voter votes by leaving a
ballot in a single round. The outcome is then determined by these ballots
and some mathematical algorithm. Furthermore, we assume that either each
ballot contains the name of a party, or that each ballot contains a list of one
or several candidates. (In fact, the first case can be regarded as a special
case of the second, since each party may be regarded as a predefined list of
candidates.) Moreover, we consider both methods where the order of the
names on the ballot matter and those where it does not, and it is usually
important to distinguish between these two cases. Hence, we consider the
following three different types of election methods; we will see that these
three types often have to be considered separately.4
party ballots: The candidates are organized in parties, with separate
lists of candidates. Each ballot contains the name of a party, and
seats are distributed among the parties. In this case we are only
interested in the distribution of seats among the parties. (We thus
ignore how seats are distributed within each party.)
unordered ballots: Each ballot contains a set of one or several can-
didates; their order on the ballot does not matter.
ordered ballots: Each ballot contains a list of one or several candi-
dates, in order of preference.5
2.1. Some notation. Let V denote the set of all voters, and V := |V| the
number of votes. Formally, an election may be regarded as a family (σν)ν∈V
of ballots, where each ballot belongs to the set B of possible ballots.6 Let
C be the set of parties in the party ballot case and otherwise the set of
candidates. Then, in the party ballot case, B = C (the set of parties); with
unordered ballots, B is the set of subsets of C; with ordered ballots, B is
the set of sequences of distinct elements of C. (We assume tacitly that C is
finite, but sufficiently large when needed.)
4A more general type of ballot, which includes both unordered ballots and ordered
ballots as special cases, is a ballot with a weak ordering of the candidates. Election
methods for such ballots are sometimes discussed in the literature, and have even been
used, see for example [24, §18.1-2] and the references there. We will not consider such
ballots in the present paper, but see [2] for versions of PSC (and implicitly of our πPSC)
for such ballots and methods.
5An extreme version, more popular in theoretic work than in practical use, is that each
voter ranks all candidates in a linear order.
6We consider only election methods that are anonymous, so the order of the ballots
does not matter. Hence, an election can equivalently be described by a sequence (xσ)σ∈B
of integers > 0, where xσ is the number of votes for σ, i.e., the number of ballots σ.
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Remark 2.1. For convenience, we may identify the voters with their ballots,
and write e.g. σ ∈ W ⊂ V, thus treating V as a multiset of ballots. Similarly,
we often abuse notation and write
∑
σ∈V instead of
∑
ν∈V (with summands
depending on σ or σν , respectively).
We consider only election methods where the number of seats, S, is fixed
in advance. We are mainly interested in the case S > 2, but the case S = 1
(single-member constituency) is included for completeness and comparisons.
The outcome of the election is the set E of elected candidates. Thus, for
elections with unordered or ordered ballots, E is a subset of C with |E| = S.
(In the case of elections with party ballots, E can be regarded as a multi-set;
we will not use the notation E in this case.) Note that there might be ties
and therefore several possible outcomes for a given set of ballots (σν)ν∈V .
Formally, we regard the different possibilities as different elections; thus
an election can formally be defined as a pair
(
(σν)ν∈V , E
)
of a sequence of
ballots and a possible outcome.
Some general mathematical notation: x ∧ y := min{x, y}; x ∨ y :=
max{x, y}; [n] := {1, . . . , n}; |S| is the number of elements in a set S;
Hn :=
∑n
i=1 1/i, the n-th harmonic number.
Remark 2.2. It is possible to let different voters have different weights,
which in principle could be any positive real numbers. Then, the “number
of voters” in a subset of V has to be interpreted as their total weight, which
thus is a (positive) real number, not necessarily an integer; similarly
∑
σ∈V
(see Remark 2.1) has to be interpreted with weights. We leave the trivial
modifications for this extension to the reader, and continue to talk about
“numbers” of votes.
Remark 2.3. The election methods considered below are almost all homo-
geneous, meaning that the outcome remains the same if the number of votes
for each type of ballot is multiplied by the same number; in other words,
only the proportions of votes matter.7 Hence the methods are well-defined
also when the “number of votes” for each type of ballot is a positive rational
number. In fact, the homogeneous methods considered here (and all reason-
able homogeneous methods) all apply to the case when these numbers are
arbitrary positive real numbers as in Remark 2.2.
In some cases, we find it convenient to use this and allow vote numbers to
be arbitrary positive real numbers. This is not essential; real numbers can
be approximated by rational numbers if necessary, and rational numbers can
be multiplied by a common denominator to get an equivalent election with
integer numbers of votes.
7Note that this fails for quota methods and STV if the quota is rounded (up or down)
to an integer, which is often the case in practical uses. This is mathematically inconve-
nient, and theoretically bad also for other reasons, but has very little importance in large
elections. We consider mainly mathematically ideal versions without rounding, and they
are homogeneous, as are all other methods considered here. For an inhomogenous case,
see Remark 4.7.
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2.2. Proportionality thresholds. As explained in the introduction, our
goal is to define and study thresholds of proportionality π(ℓ, S) = πM(ℓ, S),
where M denotes the election method. Informally, this is the smallest pro-
portion of votes that a set W of voters may have in order to be guaranteed
at least ℓ elected candidates out of S. Here, the set W can be an organized
group (party) or not, and we may consider several different situations regard-
ing both the votes fromW and the votes from the other votersWc := V \W.
For example, the voters inW may all vote with identical ballots, or according
to some organized tactical scheme, or be unorganized with different ballots
that happen to contain some common candidate(s). Hence, we will define
several such thresholds π, which we distinguish by subscripts. (As above, the
election method is indicated by superscript.) Further versions are possible,
and are left to the readers imagination.
In general, a subscript S defines some scenario, i.e., a class of possible
elections with some restrictions on the votes from the set W and possibly
also on the votes from Wc; furthermore, S specifies, for a given ℓ and S,
what we mean by a good outcome. This should mean, in some sense, that
W gets at least ℓ candidates elected; however, as is seen below, this can be
made precise in different ways, since in some scenarios the voters inW might
vote for partly different candidates, and some voters in Wc also might vote
for some of these. We say that an outcome that is not good is bad. (“Good”
and “bad” are always from the perspective of the chosen set W of voters.
W will always denote such a set of voters, arbitrary but with the scenario
specifying some assumption on their votes.)
Given a scenario S and an election method M, we define π(ℓ, S) =
πM
S
(ℓ, S) as the smallest proportion of votes that guarantees a good out-
come. More precisely and formally:
Definition 2.4.
πMS (ℓ, S) := sup
{ |W|
|V| : elections satisfying S with a bad outcome
}
. (2.1)
Remark 2.5. One reason for the form (2.1) of the definition is that when
there are ties, the same set of ballots might lead to both a good and a
bad outcome. (In practice, the result is typically decided by lot.) The
formulation (2.1) includes such cases; thus the idea is that |W|/|V| > π(ℓ, S)
guarantees a good outcome, even in the event of ties. Similarly, there exist
election methods that are randomized algorithms, so the outcome may be
random. (E.g. some versions of STV, see Appendix A.3.1.) In such cases,
any case where there is a positive probability of a bad outcome is included
in (2.1).
Remark 2.6. Of course, the outcome might be good also in some cases
where |W|/|V| < π(ℓ, S) (depending on, e.g., how other voters vote); to
have more that π(ℓ, S) of the votes is sufficient but not necessary for a good
outcome.
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Remark 2.7. The case ℓ = 1 is of particular interest: πS(1, S) is the
smallest proportion that guarantees the election of at least one representative
of W. This is called the threshold of exclusion [38; 28].
Also the other extreme case ℓ = S is of interest: πS(S, S) is the small-
est proportion that guarantees W to get all seats, excluding all minorities
(assuming S).
As another example, if S is odd, then πS
(
(S + 1)/2, S
)
is the proportion
of votes that guarantees a majority of the seats.
Remark 2.8. Typically, the supremum in (2.1) is attained because ties
might appear when |W|/|V| = πS(ℓ, S), cf. Remark 2.5; in such cases, a pro-
portion of votes exactly equal to πS(ℓ, S) is not enough to guarantee a good
outcome. We may indicate whether this happens or not by a more refined
notation: if p denotes the supremum in (2.1), we may write πS(ℓ, S) = p+
or πS(ℓ, S) = p−, with p+ meaning that the supremum is attained, i.e.,
that there exists a bad outcome with a proportion of the votes exactly p,
and p− meaning that there is no such bad outcome. In other words, if
πS(ℓ, S) = p−, then a proportion of votes equal to p guarantees a good
outcome, while if πS(ℓ, S) = p+, then we need strictly more than p in order
to be sure.
For example, the formulation of the DPC in Section 1 uses “more than”,
and is thus equivalent to πPSC(ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S+1+, while PSC uses “at least”, and
is thus equivalent to πPSC(ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S−.
We will occasionally use the refined notation, but usually not; this is then
left to the reader.
Note that almost all values calculated below are of the “+” type, because
of the possibility of ties at the threshold, but we note a few, more or less
trivial, exceptions with a “−” type:
(i) When πS(ℓ, S) = 1: πS(ℓ, S) = 1+ means that even if W comprises
all voters, this does not guarantee all seats, which does not happen
for reasonable methods and scenarios, while πS(ℓ, S) = 1− is perfectly
possible, also for ℓ < S, see e.g. Theorem 9.3.
(ii) When πS(ℓ, S) is irrational. (Unless we allow real numbers of votes,
see Remark 2.2.) This is usually not the case, but can happen e.g. for
the divisor method Div(γ) in Theorem 4.2 with irrational γ (never used
in practice as far as I know) or for the Estonian method (Footnote 22
in Appendix A.1).
(iii) Some cases for election methods with special tie-breaking rules. For
example, for D’Hondt’s method with ties always broken in favour
of the largest party, πD
′H
party(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S+1+ for ℓ 6 (S + 1)/2, but
πD
′H
party(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S+1− for ℓ > (S + 1)/2, cf. (4.3). Another example
is given in Remark 6.8.
Hence, the property that some given proportion p ∈ [0, 1] of votes is
enough to guarantee ℓ seats, which really means π(ℓ, S) 6 p−, is in practice
equivalent to π(ℓ, S) < p. (Note that this holds even in the exceptional case
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(ii), since then π(ℓ, S) = |W|/V cannot occur.) For example, in practice,
PSC can be written as πPSC(ℓ, S) <
ℓ
S , with strict inequality, when ℓ < S.
Remark 2.9. Formally, the refined notation in Remark 2.8 means that we
regard πS(ℓ, S) as a member of the split interval (also called two arrow
space), which contains two elements x+ and x− for each x ∈ [0, 1], and
that (2.1) is interpreted in this space with its natural order, and a real x
identified with x+. The split interval, with its order topology, has interesting
topological properties and is a standard example in topology, but we do not
need any of this here.
In some cases, πS(ℓ, S) may be determined by some bad outcome with
small V = |V|, while a smaller proportion of votes suffices to get a good
outcome when V is large. This may happen, for example, becuse of rounding
effects in the election method as in Remark 4.7. It may also happen because
some tactical voting scheme requires votes to be split e.g. equally between
two candidates, which is impossible when V is odd, see Example 5.8. In
such cases it is more interesting to consider only large V , or more precisely,
the limit as V →∞, and define
πS(ℓ, S) := lim sup
|V|→∞
{ |W|
|V| : elections satisfying S with a bad outcome
}
.
(2.2)
Note that by the definitions (2.1) and (2.2), always
πS(ℓ, S) 6 πS(ℓ, S). (2.3)
Remark 2.10. For an homogeneous election method, and a scenario that
does not assume that the voters in W agree to split their votes on different
lists according to some strategy, it is easy to see that πM
S
(ℓ, S) = πM
S
(ℓ, S). In
fact, consider any election with a bad outcome, and replace each ballot by N
identical ballots, for some large integer N . This gives a new election with (by
our assumptions onM andS) the same elected set E and thus a bad outcome
with the same proportion |W|/V , but V replaced by NV . Letting N →∞,
we obtain πM
S
(ℓ, S) > |W|/V , and thus πM
S
(ℓ, S) > πM
S
(ℓ, S), showing that
the general inequality (2.3) is an equality in this case. This applies to all
election methods considered in the present paper except versions of quota
methods and STV with rounding of the quota, and to all scenarios defined
below except tactic.
In most cases studied below, π = π is obvious from Remark 2.10, or follows
from the given proofs; we will usually not comment on this or mention π at
all in such cases, leaving this to the reader. We will thus discuss π mainly
in cases where it differs from π. (In such cases we instead often leave π to
the reader.)
In the next section we give a few general properties of the definition.
In the following sections we put life in the general definitions above by
specifying some scenarios S, and calculating πM
S
(ℓ, S) for some methods M.
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We usually treat the three different types of ballots separately. The case of
party ballots in Section 4 is straightforward, and can be seen as a warm-up
to the remaining sections with ordered and unordered ballots, where there
are many reasonable choices of definitions of S. Our goal is to investigate
some of these choices of S, and to calculate πM
S
(ℓ, S) for various election
methods M. (In a few cases we give only some bounds.) Note that lower
bounds always are found by giving examples, where the election method M
gives (or may give, in case of ties) a bad outcome for the chosen S.
There are many election methods, including many not mentioned in the
present paper, and we define thresholds πS for several different scenarios
(and further may be constructed), so there are many potential combinations
and we will only give complete results for some of them. There are lots
of cases remaining; these should be regarded as open problems (some are
stated explicitly for emphasis), and we invite other researchers to continue
this work.
The scenarios and thresholds that we consider are defined in Definitions
4.1 and 4.11 (πparty), 5.1 (πsame), 5.2 (πtactic), 6.1 (πPJR), 6.2 (πEJR), 8.1
(πPSC), 8.2 (πwPSC).
The election methods that are studied in the paper are the following;
each is listed after the abbreviation that we use. Brief definitions, and some
alternative names, are given in Appendix A.
(i) Party ballots
(a) D′H: D’Hondt’s method.
(b) StL: Sainte-Lague¨’s method.
(c) Adams: Adams’s method.
(d) Div(γ): Divisor method with divisors d(n) = n− 1 + γ, γ ∈ [0, 1].
(e) LR: Method of Largest Remainder.
(f) Droop: Droop’s method.
(g) Q(δ): Quota method with quota V/(S + δ), δ ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) Unordered ballots
(a) BV: Block Vote.
(b) AV: Approval Vote.
(c) SNTV: Single Non-Transferable Vote.
(d) LV(L): Limited Vote, with L votes per voter.
(e) CV: Cumulative Vote.
(f) CV=: Equal and Even Cumulative Vote.
(g) Phr-u: Phragme´n’s unordered method.
(h) Th-opt, Th-opt(w): Thiele’s optimization method.
(i) Th-add, Th-add(w): Thiele’s addition method.
(j) Th-elim: Thiele’s elimination method.
(iii) Ordered ballots
(a) STV: Single Transferable Vote. (This is really a family of meth-
ods, see Appendix A.3.1.)
(b) Phr-o: Phragme´n’s ordered method.
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(c) Th-o: Thiele’s ordered method.
(d) Borda(w): Borda method with weights w.
Some numerical values for small S are given as illustrations and for com-
parisons in Appendix B.
For methods with ordered or unordered ballots, there are no formal par-
ties in the definition of the methods. Nevertheless, we will sometimes, in
particular in examples, talk about parties also when discussing such meth-
ods; we then mean a (formal or informal) group of voters with a common
interest, typically voting with identical ballots, or possibly according to an
organized strategy.
3. General properties
We assume always 1 6 ℓ 6 S. By the definitions (2.1) and (2.2),
0 6 π(ℓ, S) 6 π(ℓ, S) 6 1. (3.1)
We state some further simple general results. These hold for any reason-
able scenario S and any reasonable election method, but since we do not
formally define what we mean by ’reasonable’, and we have not made any
formal restrictions on the scenarios S and what a bad outcome might be,
we call these results “Theorem”. They are real Theorems for the scenarios
and the election methods considered in the present paper.8
“Theorem” 3.1.
π(1, S) >
1
S + 1
. (3.2)
Proof. Suppose that there are S+1 parties with one candidate each, and that
each voter votes for only one of the candidates, with equally many voters
(V/(S + 1)) for each. By symmetry, none of the candidates is guaranteed a
seat. (A typical election method would select S of the S + 1 candidates by
lot.) Hence, if W is the set of voters voting for candidate A, so |W|/|V| =
1/(S + 1), then a bad event can occur. 
“Theorem” 3.2. If (S + 1)/ℓ is an integer, then
π(ℓ, S) >
ℓ
S + 1
. (3.3)
Proof. By the same proof as “Theorem” 3.1, now taking (S + 1)/ℓ parties
with exactly ℓ candidates each (the last requirement disappears for party
ballots methods), and equally many voters each. 
Remark 3.3. Note that (3.3) is not valid in general for arbitrary ℓ and S,
at least not in the case ℓ > (S+1)/2. As is well-known, with the Block Vote
method, a group of voters with a majority of the votes will get all seats if
they vote for the same candidates. Hence πBV
S
(ℓ, S) = 1/2 for every ℓ 6 S
and typical S, see Theorem 5.4.
8A scenario with stricter assumptions on the votes from Wc than on the votes from W
might fail some of these “Theorems”, but we do not consider any such case.
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“Theorem” 3.4. If 1 6 ℓ 6 S, then
π(ℓ, S) + π(S + 1− ℓ, S) > 1. (3.4)
More generally, for any ℓ1, . . . , ℓm with ℓ1 + · · ·+ ℓm > S,
π(ℓ1, S) + · · · + π(ℓm, S) > 1. (3.5)
Proof. Suppose that (3.4) fails. Then we can find a (large) V = |V| and a set
of voters W ⊂ V such that |W|/V > π(ℓ, S) and |Wc|/V > π(S + ℓ− 1, S).
ThusW can get some candidates A1, . . . , Aℓ elected, andWc some S+1− ℓ
others B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ. But then at least S+1 candidates will be elected, a
contradiction.
The same argument shows (3.5). 
Note that (3.5) implies both (3.2) and (3.3), by taking all ℓi := ℓ and
m := (S + 1)/ℓ.
Remark 3.5. The “Theorems” above hold for π too.
Remark 3.6. Recall that the threshold π is the infimum that guarantees a
good outcome. Thus, a small π is better (from the point of view of propor-
tionality and representability), and proportionality criteria are always of the
form π(ℓ, S) 6 p for some p (possibly with strict inequality, see Remark 2.8).
Conversely, a large π is bad, and the extreme π(ℓ, S) = 1 means that we
need (almost) all votes in order to be sure to avoid a bad outcome.
Hence, the lower bounds in “Theorems” 3.2 and 3.4 give a bound on
what can be achieved by any election method, and they support the idea
that ℓ/(S+1) is the optimum, and therefore perhaps desirable; cf. (in related
terms) Remark 1.1. (As shown in Remark 3.3, π(ℓ, S) < ℓ/(S+1) is possible
for some ℓ, but “Theorem” 3.4 implies that then π(ℓ′, S) > ℓ′/(S + 1) for
ℓ′ = S + 1− ℓ, so it is impossible to have π(ℓ, S) < ℓ/(S + 1) for all ℓ.)
Problem 3.7. What is π∗∗(ℓ, S) := inf π
M
S
(ℓ, S) for any given ℓ and S (with
1 6 ℓ 6 S), taking the infimum over all reasonable scenarios S and election
methods M? What is the infimum over M for a given S?
The results above, together with simple examples, answer this problem
in some cases. Note that, for all ℓ and S, using (4.3) below,
π∗∗(ℓ, S) 6 π
D′H
party(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (3.6)
Hence, “Theorem” 3.2 shows that equality holds in (3.6) when (S + 1)/ℓ
is an integer. Furthermore, if ℓ > (S + 1)/2, then “Theorem” 3.4 implies
π(ℓ, S) > 1/2, which is attained by πBVparty (Theorem 5.4), and thus
π∗∗(ℓ, S) =
1
2
, ℓ > (S + 1)/2. (3.7)
Remark 3.8. Let ℓ < m. It might be argued that if W gets less than ℓ
seats, then W gets less than m, and therefore π(ℓ, S) 6 π(m,S) ought to
hold. However, this is not always true, since our scenarios often include
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restrictions on the votes that depend on ℓ. In fact, Theorem 6.10 below
shows that πBVEJR is a counterexample, see Remark 6.13 and Example 6.14.
Some proposed proportionality criteria state (for a specified scenario S)
that a set of voters that form a fraction p of all voters should get at least
the same proportion of seats, rounded down, i.e., at least ⌊pS⌋ seats. This
simply means that πS(ℓ, S) < ℓ/S; we state this formally for easy reference.
“Theorem” 3.9. The property that a set of voters W with a fraction p =
|W|/V of the votes always gets at least ⌊pS⌋ seats is equivalent to
πS(ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S
−, 1 6 ℓ 6 S, (3.8)
and to
πS(ℓ, S) <
ℓ
S
, 1 6 ℓ < S. (3.9)
Proof. The property is equivalent to saying that for each integer ℓ 6 S, if
|W|/V > ℓ/S, then W will get at least ℓ seats. This is trivial for ℓ = 0, and
otherwise equivalent to (3.8).
Furthermore, (3.8) is, in reasonable cases, trivial for ℓ = S, and otherwise
equivalent to (3.9), see Remark 2.8. 
4. Party ballots
Proportional election methods are used for political elections in many
countries, in most (but not all) cases using a list method with party lists.
Thus, each ballot contains the name of one party, i.e., each voter votes for
a party, and each party is given a number of seats decided by the numbers
of votes for the parties.
Definition 4.1 (Party ballots, πparty). Suppose that all voters in W vote
for the same party A. A good outcome is when at least ℓ candidates from A
are elected.
πparty is the same as the threshold of exclusion defined by Rae, Hanby and
Loosemore [38] (ℓ = 1) and [37] (ℓ > 1), see also Lijphart and Gibberd [28].
There are two main classes of proportional list methods: divisor methods
and quota methods, see Appendix A.1 for definitions.
For divisor methods, the threshold πparty was found for D’Hondt’s method
by Rae, Hanby and Loosemore [38; 37], and for Sainte-Lague¨’s method by
Lijphart and Gibberd [28]. General divisor methods were treated by Palo-
mares och Ramı´rez [30], with further results by Jones and Wilson [25]. In
particular, [30] showed the following explicit result for linear divisor meth-
ods with divisors d(n) = n − 1 + γ, γ ∈ [0, 1]; recall that these include the
important D’Hondt (D′H) and Sainte-Lague¨ (StL) methods, with γ = 1 and
γ = 1/2, respectively, as well as several less important methods. This result
is also implicit in Kopfermann [27, Satz 6.2.3].
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Theorem 4.2 (Palomares och Ramı´rez [30]; Kopfermann [27]). Let Div(γ)
be the divisor method with divisors d(n) = n − 1 + γ for some γ ∈ [0, 1].
Then, for 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
π
Div(γ)
party (ℓ, S) =
ℓ− 1 + γ
ℓ− 1 + γ(S + 2− ℓ) . (4.1)
In particular, for any γ ∈ [0, 1],
π
Div(γ)
party (1, S) =
1
S + 1
. (4.2)
As special cases [38; 37; 28], we have, for 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
πD
′H
party(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, (4.3)
πStLparty(ℓ, S) =
2ℓ− 1
S + ℓ
. (4.4)
Some numerical values of πD
′H
party(ℓ, S) and π
StL
party(ℓ, S) are given in Tables 2
and 3 in Appendix B.
Proof. πparty(ℓ, S) equals Sℓ−1 in [30]. 
Example 4.3. Another special case is Adams’s method Adams, which is
the case γ = 0, i.e., d(n) = n− 1. In this case, for ℓ > 2, (4.1) simply yields
πAdamsparty (ℓ, S) = 1, 2 6 ℓ 6 S. (4.5)
For ℓ = 1, however, (4.1) yields the indeterminate 0/0. The reason is that
Adams’s method gives every party at least one seat. Hence, if the number
of parties is at most the number of seats, then the threshold π(1, S) = 0
(and (4.5) is obvious with S parties), but if there are more parties, then the
method is ill-defined; for example, if the seats are distributed by lot then
πAdamsparty (1, S) = 1, but if they are distributed to the S largest parties, then
πAdamsparty (1, S) = 1/(S + 1) (in accordance with (4.2)).
9
Remark 4.4. Lijphart and Gibberd [28] consider also the modified Sainte-
Lague¨ method, with d(1) = 0.7 and d(n) = n − 0.5 for n > 1. (Or equiv-
alently, and traditionally, d(1) = 1.4 and d(n) = 2n − 1 for n > 1.) Then
they find
πparty(ℓ, S) =
{
1
S+1 , ℓ = 1,
2ℓ−1
1.4S+0.6ℓ+0.4 , 2 6 ℓ 6 S.
(4.6)
For the modification with d(1) = 0.6 instead (or, equivalently, the sequence
of divisors 1.2, 3, 5, . . . ), used in Sweden since 2018, similar calculations yield
πparty(ℓ, S) =
{
1
S+1 , ℓ = 1,
2ℓ−1
1.2S+0.8ℓ+0.2 , 2 6 ℓ 6 S.
(4.7)
9 The same applies to any method guaranteeing every party a seat, for example
Huntington–Hill’s method used for allocation in the US House of Representatives.
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Remark 4.5. [28], [30] and [27] more generally calculate the thresholds
when the number of parties is given. For simplicity, we do not consider that
restriction in the present paper; we let the number of parties be arbitrary.
(A fixed number of parties may be covered by our formalism too, if desired,
by including it in the definition of the scenario S.)
We next compute πparty for quota methods, including the method of
Largest Remainder and Droop’s method, at least assuming that the quota
is defined without rounding. For the method of Largest Remainder, this
was done by Lijphart and Gibberd [28]. Presumably, the general case too
has been done previously, and the result is implicit in Kopfermann [27, Satz
6.2.11], see also [22, Sats 8.8], but we do not know any reference to an ex-
plicit formula. The general formula is a little involved, and for convenience
we give three equivalent versions of it.
Theorem 4.6 (Kopfermann [27]). Let Q(δ) be the quota method with quota
V/(S + δ), where δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
π
Q(δ)
party(ℓ, S) =
ℓ(S + 2− ℓ)− 1 + δ
(S + δ)(S + 2− ℓ) =
ℓ
S + δ
− 1− δ
(S + δ)(S + 2− ℓ)
=
ℓ
S + 1
+
(1− δ)(ℓ− 1)(S + 1− ℓ)
(S + δ)(S + 1)(S + 2− ℓ) . (4.8)
In particular,
π
Q(δ)
party(1, S) =
1
S + 1
. (4.9)
As special cases, for δ = 0 [28] and δ = 1, respectively,
πLRparty(ℓ, S) =
ℓ(S + 2− ℓ)− 1
S(S + 2− ℓ) =
ℓ
S
− 1
S(S + 2− ℓ) , (4.10)
πDroopparty (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (4.11)
Some numerical values of πDroopparty (ℓ, S) and π
LR
party(ℓ, S) are given in Tables 2
and 4 in Appendix B.
Proof. Suppose that party i gets vi votes and si seats, with
∑
i vi = V and∑
i si = S. Let xi := vi/Q =
vi
V (S + δ). Thus∑
i
xi =
∑
i vi
V
(S + δ) = S + δ. (4.12)
The quota method means that for some t ∈ [0, 1], see (A.2),
si + t− 1 6 xi 6 si + t. (4.13)
In particular, for a party i with si > 0,
xi > si + t− 1 > tsi, (4.14)
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and trivially xi > tsi also if si = 0. Hence, using also (4.12) and x1− s1 6 t
from (4.13),
S + δ = x1 +
∑
i 6=1
xi > x1 +
∑
i 6=1
tsi = x1 + t(S − s1) (4.15)
> x1 + (x1 − s1)(S − s1) = x1(S + 1− s1)− s1(S − s1). (4.16)
Consequently,
x1 6
S + δ + s1(S − s1)
S − s1 + 1 = s1 + 1−
1− δ
S − s1 + 1 . (4.17)
Furthermore, we may have equality in (4.17), for any given S and s1 6 S,
by taking
t = x1 − s1 = S − s1 + δ
S − s1 + 1 ∈ [0, 1] (4.18)
and S − s1 other parties with xi = t and si = 1; note that this satisfies
(4.12) and (4.13). We may then take vi := Nxi for a suitable integer N in
order to get integer numbers of votes. (Provided δ is rational; otherwise we
take N large and approximate by rounding vi suitably.)
Taking s1 = ℓ − 1, and noting that the bound in (4.17) is increasing in
s1, we see that if (4.17) does not hold, then party 1 has to get at least
ℓ seats, and that this is best possible. Since the proportion of votes is
v1/V = x1/(S + δ), cf. (4.12), it thus follows from (4.17) that
π
Q(δ)
party(ℓ, S) =
1
S + δ
(
ℓ− 1− δ
S − ℓ+ 2
)
. (4.19)
This is equivalent to the three different forms in (4.8) by elementary algebraic
manipulations. 
Remark 4.7. If the quota is defined by rounding V/(S + δ) up or down to
an integer, the result still holds for πparty, see (2.2).
Remark 4.8. The assumption δ ∈ [0, 1] means that the standard definition
of the quota method works. The results extends (with the same proof) to
any real δ ∈ (−S, 1), i.e. quota Q > V/(S + 1), with the interpretation
in Appendix A.1.4; note that then still t 6 1 in the proof. We have not
investigated the case δ > 1, e.g. the Imperiali quota V/(S + 2).
Remark 4.9. Note that for ℓ = 1, all linear divisor methods and all quotient
methods in Theorems 4.2 and 4.6 yield equality in (3.2).
Remark 4.10. Comparing (4.3) and (4.4), we see that
πD
′H
party(ℓ, S) 6 π
StL
party(ℓ, S), 1 6 ℓ 6 S, (4.20)
with strict inequality for ℓ > 1. This can be interpreted as meaning that
D’Hondt’s method has better proportionality than Sainte-Lague¨, in a certain
sense. On the other hand, it is well-known that Sainte-Lague¨’s method is
(asymptotically) unbiased, in an average sense, while D’Hondt’s method has
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a bias in favour of larger parties, see e.g. [23], so in this sense Sainte-Lague¨’s
method is more proportional than D’Hondt. (The same results hold when
comparing the method of Largest Remainder and Droop’s method, see again
e.g. [23].)
This just stresses that there is no single criterion that defines “propor-
tionality”.
4.1. Unordered and ordered ballots. We have here considered election
methods with party ballots. Also in an election using unordered or ordered
ballots, it may happen that the voters are so polarised that they do not use
their freedom to mix candidates; instead they all belong to different parties
(organised or not), with all voters in each party voting for the same party
list. (These naturally being disjoint.) The election then really becomes an
election with party ballots. We formally define, for use in later sections, a
scenario for this special (but not unrealistic) case, using the same notation
as in Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.11 (Party lists for unordered or ordered ballots, πparty). Sup-
pose that all voters vote for disjoint party lists, and that all voters in W
vote for the same list σ, containing at least ℓ candidates. A good outcome
is when at least ℓ candidates from σ are elected.
5. Unordered ballots: Block Vote, SNTV, Limited Vote, . . .
In this section we begin the study of election methods using unordered
ballots by studying some simple, classical election methods, viz. Block Vote,
Approval Vote, Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), Limited Vote, Cu-
mulative Vote. The results below for them are not new; on the contrary,
they were known already in the 19th century.
We begin by defining scenarios for elections with unordered ballots. For
later use, we note that these definitions apply also to elections with ordered
ballots. One interesting scenario that we consider is the party list case in
Definition 4.11. Another interesting scenario is the less restrictive assump-
tion that the voters in W vote on a common list of candidates, while the
other voters may be less organized and we do not assume anyting about
their votes.
Definition 5.1 (Ordered or unordered ballots, πsame). Suppose that all vot-
ers in W vote for the same list of candidates A. (In the ordered case, all
vote on the same ordered list.) The other voters may vote arbitrarily. We
assume |A| > ℓ. A good outcome is when at least ℓ candidates from A are
elected.
It is obvious that for some election methods (e.g. SNTV), it is sometimes
a bad strategy for a group of voters to vote on the same list, and that a
perty in order to be successful is forced to use more elaborate strategies.
We therefore consider also a scenario where we assume that the set of voters
W is organized in some sense, so that the voters in W vote as directed by a
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“leadership” or “party organization”; thus making tactical voting feasible.
We also assume that the leadership is intelligent and uses the mathematically
optimal strategy.10
Definition 5.2 (Ordered or unordered ballots, πtactic). Let a set A of can-
didates be given, with |A| > ℓ, and suppose that all voters in W vote as
instructed (by some intelligent leader). A good outcome is when at least ℓ
candidates from A are elected.
Before considering specific election methods, we note two simple relations.
Theorem 5.3. For any election method with unordered or ordered ballots,
and 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
πparty(ℓ, S) 6 πsame(ℓ, S), (5.1)
πtactic(ℓ, S) 6 πsame(ℓ, S). (5.2)
Proof. Each instance of the scenario party (Definition 4.11) is also an in-
stance of the scenario same (Definition 5.1), and the definition of good out-
come is the same. Hence, a bad outcome for party is also a bad outcome
for same, and thus (2.1) implies (5.1), since the supremum is taken over a
larger set for πsame.
Next, since πtactic assumes thatW uses an optimal strategy, a bad outcome
for πtactic with a given setW means thatW has no strategy that guarantees
a good outcome. In particular, the strategy that all voters in W vote for
the same list A may fail, so there is a bad outcome for πsame too for this W.
Hence, (2.1) yields (5.2). 
Consider first the simple and important Block Vote method BV (multi-
member plurality ; plurality-at-large); recall that here every voter votes for
(at most) S candidates. In this case, the simple strategy to vote on the same
list is the best strategy. As is well-known, this method gives a majority all
seats, so the next result is rather obvious.
Theorem 5.4. For Block Vote:
πBVparty(ℓ, S) = π
BV
same(ℓ, S) = π
BV
tactic(ℓ, S) =
1
2
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (5.3)
Proof. If |W| > 12V , so |W| > |Wc|, then W will get all S seats by voting
on the same list. Conversely, if |W| < 12V , then W will not get any seat,
regardless of how they vote, if all other voters vote on a common list (with
at least S names) disjoint from A. This argument shows all three cases. 
10 To find the optimal strategy might be a more or less difficult and perhaps interesting
problem in game theory. We assume that the size |W| of W as well as the total number
of voters V are known; otherwise further game theoretical complications arise. Note also
that since the definition (2.1) consider the worst cases, we may assume that the strategy
is known to an omniscient adversary.
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Remark 5.5. For our purposes, it does not matter whether a voter has to
vote for exactly S candidates, or whether it only has to be at most S. This
is seen from the proof above, but also because we (implicitly) assume that
there is an unlimited number of potential candidates, so that a voter always
has the option of throwing away some votes on dummy candidates with no
hope of being elected. The same applies to Limited Vote below.
Approval Vote (AV) differs mathematically from Block Vote only in that
each ballot may contain an arbitrary number of candidates. The proof above
applies to this method to, giving the following result.
Theorem 5.6. For Approval Vote:
πAVparty(ℓ, S) = π
AV
same(ℓ, S) = π
AV
tactic(ℓ, S) =
1
2
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (5.4)
Another related simple election method is Single Non-Transferable Vote
(SNTV), where each voter only votes for one candidate. In this case, if the
objective is to get more than one candidate elected, it is obviously a stupid
strategy to let all voters in W vote in the same way, so more elaborate
strategies are required, and πparty and πsame are not relevant. The following
result was essentially shown by Droop [13, p. 174] (and may have been known
earlier); it is a special case of Theorem 5.10 below, shown by Dodgson [12].
Theorem 5.7 (Droop [13]). For Single Non-Transferable Vote:
πSNTVtactic (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (5.5)
Proof. Let W use the strategy to divide its votes equally between ℓ candi-
dates A1, . . . , Aℓ. Of course, an exactly equal split is possible only if |W|
is divisible by ℓ, but W can always assure that each candidate gets al least
⌊|W|/ℓ⌋ > |W|/ℓ− 1 votes.
If the outcome is bad, then not all these ℓ candidates get elected; say
that Aℓ does not. Then, at least S + 1 − ℓ other candidates are elected.
Each of these must have at least as many votes as the unsuccessful Aℓ, and
thus > |W|/ℓ − 1 votes. Hence, there are (at least) S + 1 candidates with
> |W|/ℓ− 1 votes, and consequently,
V > (S + 1)
( |W|
ℓ
− 1
)
(5.6)
or
|W| < ℓ
S + 1
V + ℓ (5.7)
and
|W|
V
<
ℓ
S + 1
+
ℓ
V
. (5.8)
Hence, the definition (2.2) yields πSNTVtactic (ℓ, S) 6 ℓ/(S + 1).
Conversely, let V be divisible by S + 1 and write w := V/(S + 1). If
|W| = ℓS+1V = ℓw, then |Wc| = V − |W| = V − ℓw = (S + 1− ℓ)w. Hence,
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Wc may split their votes on S + 1 − ℓ candidates B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ with w
votes each. On the other hand, for any strategy used by W, at least one of
A1, . . . , Aℓ gets at most w votes. Hence a bad outcome is possible, and (2.2)
yields πSNTVtactic (ℓ, S) > |W|/V = ℓ/(S + 1). 
In Theorem 5.7, we use π and not π, i.e., we consider the limit as V →
∞. The reason is that the strategy used in the proof above, of splitting
the votes equally between some candidates, in general can be followed only
approximately due to divisibility issues. The following example shows that
this really matters when V is small.
Example 5.8. Let ℓ = 2, S = 3, |W| = 3 and V = 5. Suppose that W
wants A1 and A2 to be elected. Regardless of the strategy used byW, either
A1 or A2 will get only one vote, say A2. Hence, if the two voters in Wc vote
with one vote each for B1 and B2, then there is a tie and it is possible that
B1 and B2 are elected together with A1, a bad outcome. Consequently,
πSNTVtactic (2, 3) >
3
5
>
1
2
= πSNTVtactic (2, 3). (5.9)
Remark 5.9. Theorem 5.7 shows that SNTV under ideal conditions can
be regarded as a proportional method. However, as is well-known, there are
obvious practical problems with using this strategy in, say, a general election.
Moreover, the strategy assumes that the size of W and of its opponents are
known; misjudgement can lead to disastrous results. The same applies to
Limited Vote and Cumulative Vote below. (These and other problems were
discussed already by Droop [13].)
More generally, Limited Vote is a version of Block Vote, where each ballot
contains only (at most) L candidates, for some fixed L 6 S; we use the
notation LV(L). Thus, Block Vote is the special case L = S, and SNTV is
the special case L = 1.
Theorems 5.4 and 5.7 generalize to Limited Vote as follows. Again we
consider π for the same reason as for SNTV. This result was proved by
Charles Dodgson11 [12], who also gave a table of numerical values for all
cases with 1 6 S 6 6. (The result may have been known earlier; Droop [13]
mentions a few values in his discussions, so it is perhaps likely that he knew
the general formula.)
Theorem 5.10 (Dodgson [12]). For Limited Vote: Let 1 6 L 6 S. Then,
for 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
π
LV(L)
tactic (ℓ, S) =
min
{
1, L/(S + 1− ℓ)}
min
{
1, L/(S + 1− ℓ)}+min{1, L/ℓ} (5.10)
=
ℓmin
{
L,S + 1− ℓ}
ℓmin
{
L,S + 1− ℓ}+ (S + 1− ℓ)min{L, ℓ} . (5.11)
11Better known by his pseudonym Lewis Carroll used when writing fiction.
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Hence, if 1 6 L 6 (S + 1)/2, then
π
LV(L)
tactic (ℓ, S) =

L
S+1+L−ℓ , 1 6 ℓ 6 L,
ℓ
S+1 , L 6 ℓ 6 S + 1− L,
ℓ
ℓ+L , S + 1− L 6 ℓ 6 S,
(5.12)
and if (S + 1)/2 6 L 6 S, then
π
LV(L)
tactic (ℓ, S) =

L
S+1+L−ℓ , 1 6 ℓ 6 S + 1− L,
1
2 , S + 1− L 6 ℓ 6 L,
ℓ
L+ℓ , L 6 ℓ 6 S,
(5.13)
Proof. As for SNTV, the strategy ofW is to divide its votes equally between
its ℓ favoured candidates A1, . . . , Aℓ. If ℓ 6 L, then all voters in W vote for
the same list {A1, . . . , Aℓ}. (If required to vote for exactly L > ℓ candidates,
they further vote for L−ℓ dummy candidates each; these have to come from
at least two different sets for different voters. See Remark 5.5.)
On the other hand, if ℓ > L, then the votes are split so that each of the ℓ
candidates getsWL/ℓ+O(1) votes. (E.g. by splitting the votes as equally as
possible between all L-subsets of {A1, . . . , Aℓ}, or, more practically, between
the ℓ sets {Ai, . . . , Ai+L−1}, 1 6 i 6 ℓ, with indices taken modulo ℓ.)
This strategy thus gives each candidate Ai at least
vA := min
(
1,
L
ℓ
)
|W|+O(1) (5.14)
votes. Conversely, for any strategy, at least one of A1, . . . , Aℓ gets at most
vA votes. (Assuming that they get no votes from Wc.)
Similarly, Wc can give each of S − ℓ + 1 candidates B1, . . . , BS−ℓ+1 at
least
vB := min
(
1,
L
S + 1− ℓ
)
(V − |W|) +O(1) (5.15)
votes, but they cannot give all S − ℓ+ 1 candidates more than vB votes.
It follows that the outcome is good if vA > vB , but bad, for any strategy
of W, if vA < vB. It follows that π satisfies the equation
πmin
(
1,
L
ℓ
)
=
(
1− π)min(1, L
S + 1− ℓ
)
. (5.16)
This gives (5.10), and (5.11)–(5.12) follow. 
For π
LV(L)
same , only ℓ 6 L are relevant. In this case, the strategy in the proof
of Theorem 5.10 is to vote on the same list, and the proof (without O(1))
shows also the following.
Theorem 5.11. For Limited Vote: If 1 6 ℓ 6 L 6 S, then
π
LV(L)
same (ℓ, S) = π
LV(L)
tactic (ℓ, S) = π
LV(L)
tactic (ℓ, S), (5.17)
given in (5.10)–(5.13). 
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Example 5.12. For ℓ = 1, Theorems 5.10 and 5.11 yield
π
LV(L)
same (1, S) = π
LV(L)
tactic (1, S) =
L
S + L
. (5.18)
Furthermore, taking L = 1, the proof above applies also to πparty(1, S); thus,
πSNTVparty (1, S) = π
SNTV
same (1, S) = π
SNTV
tactic (1, S) =
1
S + 1
. (5.19)
It is easy to see that the result in Theorem 5.7 above for SNTV applies
also to Cumulative Vote (CV), see Appendix A.2.5, with the same proof.
However, Cumulative Vote has the practical advantage that the strategy of
splitting the vote equally between ℓ candidates may be easier to organize;
in particular, if the version of Cumulative Vote used allows each voter to
split the vote equally between ℓ candidates, then all voters in W can vote
the same way. Hence we obtain the following result, again essentially shown
by Droop [13, p. 174].
Theorem 5.13 (Droop [13]). For Cumulative Vote:
πCVtactic(ℓ, S) = π
SNTV
tactic (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (5.20)
Furthermore, in an ideal case where a voter may split the vote equally be-
tween ℓ candidates,
πCVtactic(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (5.21)
The scenarios party and same are not very interesting for Cumulative Vote,
since they allow the voters in W to spread their votes too thinly over too
many candidates. This is seen formally in the following theorem, where we
consider the ideal Equal and Even version CV=, allowing a vote to be split
(equally) on an arbitrary number of candidates.12
Theorem 5.14. For (ideal) Equal and Even Cumulative Vote:
πCV
=
party(ℓ, S) = π
CV=
same(ℓ, S) = 1, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (5.22)
Proof. Let V :=W ∪U , where W := |W| > ℓ and U is disjoint from W with
|U| = S. Futhermore, let each voter be a candidate, let each voter inW vote
forW, and let each voter inWc = U vote only for herself. This is an instance
of both party and same. Furthermore, there is a tie between all candidates,
and it is possible that the outcome is E = U , which is a bad outcome for
both party and same. Hence, πCV
=
party(ℓ, S) > (W +S)/W , for any W > ℓ, and
thus πCV
=
party(ℓ, S) = 1, and similarly, or by (5.1), π
CV=
same(ℓ, S) = 1. 
Remark 5.15. We might define a scenario same= to be as same, but with
the further restriction that |A| = ℓ. Then we would have πCV=same=(ℓ, S) =
l/(S + 1). We leave this to the reader to explore further.
12 Also called Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) [7].
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Problem 5.16. Another possibility is to consider the version of Cumulative
Vote where each voter may split her vote equally on at most S candidates.
What is πCVsame(ℓ, S) for this version?
Finally we note that the strategy for SNTV in Theorem 5.7, i.e., to split
W into subsets voting for one candidate each, can be used (more or less suc-
cessfully) for any election method, This yields the following general results,
which will be used later. (Note that the results include a rigorous version of
“Theorem” 3.4 for πtactic.)
Theorem 5.17. Let M be any election method for ordered or unordered
ballots.
(i) For 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
πMtactic(ℓ, S) 6 ℓπ
M
tactic(1, S) 6 ℓπ
M
tactic(1, S). (5.23)
(ii) If ℓ+m 6 S, then
πMtactic(ℓ+m,S) 6 π
M
tactic(ℓ, S) + π
M
tactic(m,S). (5.24)
(iii) If 1 6 ℓ 6 S, then
πMtactic(ℓ, S) + π
M
tactic(S + 1− ℓ, S) > πMtactic(ℓ, S) + πMtactic(S + 1− ℓ, S) > 1.
(5.25)
(iv) If πMtactic(1, S) 6 1/(S + 1), then
πMtactic(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (5.26)
In particular, this holds if πMtactic(1, S) 6 1/(S + 1).
(v) If πMtactic(ℓ, S) 6 ℓ/(S + 1) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S, then this is an equality:
πMtactic(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (5.27)
Proof. (i): The second inequality is (2.3). The first inequality follows from
(ii) and induction, but we prefer to give a direct proof.
Fix p > πMtactic(1, S). If |W| > pℓV + ℓ, split W, as equally as possible,
into ℓ subsets Wi of sizes
|Wi| > ⌊W/ℓ⌋ >W/ℓ− 1 > pV. (5.28)
Let A1, . . . , Aℓ ∈ A be ℓ desired candidates, and let Wi vote with the aim
of electing Ai. By (5.28) and our choice of p, if V is large enough, there is
a strategy for Wi that always will succeed to get Ai elected. Hence, if each
Wi uses such a strategy, then A1, . . . , Aℓ are all elected, a good outcome for
W. Consequently,
πMtactic(ℓ, S) 6 lim sup
V→∞
pℓV + ℓ
V
= pℓ, (5.29)
and (5.23) follows because p is arbitrary with p > πMtactic(1, S).
(ii),(iii): For (iii), let m := S + 1 − ℓ. Note that the first inequality in
(5.25) follows from (2.3).
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Let p := πMtactic(ℓ, S) + π
M
tactic(m,S) + 2ε with ε > 0. If |W| > pV ,
split W into two sets W1 and W2 with |W1| >
(
πMtactic(ℓ, S) + ε
)
V − 1
and |W2| >
(
πMtactic(m,S)+ ε
)
V − 1. Then, if V is large enough, given ℓ+m
candidates A1, . . . , Aℓ+m, there exists a strategy for W1 to get A1, . . . , Aℓ
elected, and a strategy for W2 to get Aℓ+1, . . . , Aℓ+m elected. Combining
these, we have a strategy that guarantees that A1, . . . , Aℓ+m are elected.
In (iii), with ℓ+m = S + 1, this is impossible. Thus no set W ⊆ V with
|W| > pV can exist, and thus p > 1, which yields (5.25) since ε is arbitrary.
In (ii), we have shown that, for large V , we have a good outcome (with
ℓ + m elected) whenever |W| > pV , and thus πMtactic(ℓ + m,S) 6 p. This
yields (5.24), since ε is arbitrary.
(iv): Part (i) yields the inequality
πMtactic(ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S + 1
. (5.30)
Conversely, by (5.25) and (5.30) with ℓ replaced by S + 1− ℓ,
πMtactic(ℓ, S) > 1− πMtactic(S + 1− ℓ, S) > 1−
S + 1− ℓ
S + 1
=
ℓ
S + 1
. (5.31)
The final sentence follows by (2.3).
(v): By the assumption, πMtactic(1, S) 6 1/(S + 1), and thus (iv) applies
and yields (5.26). Hence, using the assumption again and (2.3),
ℓ
S + 1
= πMtactic(ℓ, S) 6 π
M
tactic(ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S + 1
, (5.32)
showing (5.27). 
6. JR, PJR, EJR
We turn to properties and thresholds intended for situations without or-
ganised parties, where a group of voters have similar opinions but do not
necessarily vote identically.
For election methods with unordered ballots, Aziz et al. [1] defined two
properties JR (justified representation) and (stronger) EJR (extended justi-
fied representation); Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [40, 41] then defined a related
property PJR (proportional justified representation) such that EJR =⇒
PJR =⇒ JR. Inspired by their definitions, we define more generally the
corresponding thresholds. Recall that E denotes the set of elected candi-
dates.
Definition 6.1 (unordered ballots, πPJR). Let A be a set of at least ℓ can-
didates, and assume that every voter in W votes for a set σ ⊇ A, i.e., for
all candidates in A and possibly also for some others. A good outcome is
when at least ℓ candidates are elected that someone in W has voted for, i.e.∣∣∣E ∩⋃σ∈W σ∣∣∣ > ℓ.
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Definition 6.2 (unordered ballots, πEJR). Let A be a set of at least ℓ can-
didates, and assume that every voter in W votes for a set σ ⊇ A, i.e., for
all candidates in A and possibly also for some others. A good outcome is
when there exists a voter in W that has voted for at least ℓ candidates that
are elected, i.e.
∣∣E ∩ σ∣∣ > ℓ for some σ ∈ W.
Note that the difference between PJR and EJR disappears for ℓ = 1:
πEJR(1, S) = πPJR(1, S). (6.1)
For larger ℓ, the scenarios EJR and PJR have the same instances; the only
difference is the definition of a good outcome. This leads to the following
inequality.
Theorem 6.3. For any election method with unordered ballots:
πPJR(ℓ, S) 6 πEJR(ℓ, S), 1 6 ℓ 6 S, (6.2)
with equality when ℓ = 1.
Proof. A good outcome for the scenario EJR is a good outcome for PJR too.
Hence, an instance with a bad outcome for PJR is a bad outcome for EJR
too, and thus the supremum in (2.1) is taken over a larger set of instances
for πEJR; hence (6.2) follows. The case ℓ = 1 is (6.1). 
We also have simple relations with the thresholds defined in earlier for
scenarios with more organized voters.
Theorem 6.4. For any election method with unordered ballots:
πparty(ℓ, S) 6 πsame(ℓ, S) 6 πPJR(ℓ, S) 6 πEJR(ℓ, S), 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (6.3)
Proof. An instance of the scenario same is also an instance of the scenario
PJR, and the outcome is good for one scenario if it is for the other. Hence,
an instance with a bad outcome for πsame is also a bad outcome for πPJR,
and thus (2.1) implies πsame(ℓ, S) 6 πPJR(ℓ, S). The other inequalities in
(6.3) are repeated from Theorems 5.3 and 6.3. 
Remark 6.5. The conditions EJR and PJR defined in [1] and [40; 41]
require a good outcome, in the sense of our definitions above, for any W
with |W| > ℓV/S, for any ℓ 6 S. The condition JR [1] is the special
case ℓ = 1 of both. Consequently, for any reasonable election method, see
Remark 2.8 and “Theorem” 3.9,
PJR ⇐⇒ πPJR(ℓ, S) < ℓ
S
, 1 6 ℓ < S, (6.4)
EJR ⇐⇒ πEJR(ℓ, S) < ℓ
S
, 1 6 ℓ < S, (6.5)
JR ⇐⇒ πPJR(1, S) < 1
S
, S > 1. (6.6)
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Let us first consider the classical election method discussed in Section 5.
It is obvious that the thresholds above are relevant for SNTV only when
ℓ = 1. In this case we have the following. (In particular, SNTV satisfies JR
by (6.6).)
Theorem 6.6. For Single Non-Transferable Vote:
πSNTVPJR (1, S) = π
SNTV
EJR (1, S) = π
SNTV
same (1, S) =
1
S + 1
, S > 1. (6.7)
Proof. For SNTV and ℓ = 1, the scenarios PJR and EJR require that all
voters in W vote on the same candidate A, and a good outcome is when A
is elected. Thus, πSNTVPJR (1, S) = π
SNTV
EJR (1, S) = π
SNTV
same (1, S), and the result
follows from (5.19). 
For BV and AV, the results in Theorems 5.4 and 5.6 extend to πPJR, but
not to πEJR. The same holds for LV(L), but in this case, similarly to SNTV
above, only the case ℓ 6 L is relevant. We consider πPJR first, and begin
with a separate treatment of BV and AV, although this result also can be
obtained as a corollary of the more complicated result for LV in Theorem 6.9.
Theorem 6.7. For Block Vote and Approval Vote:
πBVPJR(ℓ, S) = π
AV
PJR(ℓ, S) =
1
2
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (6.8)
Proof. The lower bound follows by Theorems 5.4, 5.6 and 6.4.
To bound πBVPJR(ℓ, S) from above, suppose that |W| > 12V . Then the
candidates in A have at least |W| votes each, while the candidates not in⋃
σ∈W σ have at most |Wc| = V − |W| < |W| votes each. Hence either no
candidate outside
⋃
σ∈W σ is elected, or all candidates in A are; in both cases
the outcome is good. Consequently, πBVPJR(ℓ, S) 6 1/2. The same argument
applies to AV. 
Remark 6.8. Aziz et al. [1] showed that Approval Vote does not satisfy JR
when S > 3, and that for S = 2, the answer depends on the tie-breaking
rule. By (6.6), the negative result for S > 3 is a consequence of (6.8). For
S = 2, we interpret their result using our refined notation in Remark 2.8: it
is easy to see that πAVPJR(1, 2) =
1
2+ (JR does not hold) with standard random
tie-breaking, but πAVPJR(1, 2) =
1
2− (JR holds) if we use a tie-breaking rule
that in the case of several candidates with exactly V/2 votes each, gives
preference to a pair of candidates with disjoint voter support before a pair
of candidates supported by the same voters.
Theorem 6.9. For Limited Vote: If 1 6 ℓ 6 L, then
π
LV(L)
PJR (ℓ, S) = π
LV(L)
same (ℓ, S) = π
LV(L)
tactic (ℓ, S) = π
LV(L)
tactic (ℓ, S), (6.9)
given in Theorem 5.10.
Proof. Consider a bad outcome for a set of voters W as in Definition 6.1.
Let A∗ := ⋃σ∈W σ ⊇ A, the set of candidates voted for by some voter inW.
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Since the outcome is bad, |A∗∩E| 6 ℓ−1, and thus there are at least S−ℓ+1
candidates B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ not in A∗ that are elected. For a candidate C,
let v(C) be her number of votes, and let v∗ := minj v(Bj). Thus v(Bj) > v∗
for 1 6 j 6 S + 1 − ℓ. Furthermore, any candidate C with v(C) > v∗ is
elected; in particular, there are at most ℓ− 1 such candidates in A∗.
If we modify the election by eliminating all votes on any candidate in
A∗ \A, then each voter in W votes for A, so the new election is an instance
of same. Furthermore, we still have v(Bj) > v∗ for S + 1 − ℓ candidates
Bj /∈ A, and v(Ai) > v∗ for at most ℓ− 1 candidates Ai ∈ A. Hence, even
if there are ties, a possible outcome is that B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ are elected, and
thus at most ℓ− 1 from A, a bad outcome for same.
We have shown that for every bad outcome for PJR, there is an election
with the same |W| and V and a bad outcome for same. Hence, (2.1) implies
π
LV(L)
PJR (ℓ, S) 6 π
LV(L)
same (ℓ, S). Theorem 6.4 provides the opposite inequality,
and thus equality holds. The proof is completed by Theorem 5.11. 
The results for EJR are more complicated. We state the results as three
separate theorems, but prove them together.
Theorem 6.10. For Block Vote:
πBVEJR(ℓ, S) =
{
S
2S+1−ℓ , 1 6 ℓ 6 (S + 1)/2,
2S+1−2ℓ
3S+2−3ℓ , (S + 1)/2 6 ℓ 6 S.
(6.10)
Theorem 6.11. For Approval Vote:
πAVEJR(ℓ, S) =
S
2S + 1− ℓ , 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (6.11)
Theorem 6.12. For Limited Vote: Let 1 6 L 6 S. Then, for 1 6 ℓ 6 L,
π
LV(L)
EJR (ℓ, S) =
{
L
S+L+1−ℓ , 1 6 ℓ 6 (S + 1)/2,
S+L+1−2ℓ
2S+L+2−3ℓ , (S + 1)/2 6 ℓ 6 L.
(6.12)
Some numerical values of πBVEJR(ℓ, S) and π
AV
EJR(ℓ, S) are given in Tables 5
and 6 in Appendix B.
Proof of Theorems 6.10–6.12. Take L := S for BV, and L := ∞ for AV.
Thus we can treat BV, AV and LV(L) together.
Consider a bad outcome, and let a := |W|/V and k := |E∩A|, the number
of elected from A. Note that k < ℓ, since otherwise the outcome is good,
as witnessed by any σ ∈ W. Similarly, no voter in W votes for more than
ℓ− k − 1 candidates in E \ A. Furthermore, no voter votes for more than L
candidates, so a voter in W votes for at most L − ℓ candidates outside A.
Thus, let
m(k) := (ℓ− k − 1) ∧ (L− ℓ). (6.13)
Then no voter in W votes for more than m(k) candidates in E \A. Further-
more, no voter in Wc votes for more than
m′(k) := |E \ A| ∧ L = (S − k) ∧ L (6.14)
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candidates in E \ A.
Hence, if v is the total number of votes for the S − k candidates in E \A,
then
v 6 |W|m(k) + |Wc|m′(k) = m(k)aV +m′(k)(1− a)V. (6.15)
On the other hand, there is at least one non-elected candidate in A; she has
at least |W| = aV votes, and thus each elected candidate has at least aV
votes, so v > (S − k)aV . Consequently, using (6.15),
(S − k)a 6 v/V 6 m(k)a+m′(k)(1 − a) (6.16)
and thus
1
a
− 1 = 1− a
a
>
S − k −m(k)
m′(k)
. (6.17)
Let k1 := (2ℓ− L− 1) ∨ 0, and k2 := S − L. Then (6.13)–(6.14) yield
m(k) =
{
L− ℓ, 0 6 k < k1,
ℓ− k − 1, k > k1,
(6.18)
and
m′(k) =
{
L, k 6 k2,
S − k, k > k2.
(6.19)
Using (6.18)–(6.19), it is easily verified that, regardless of the value of k2,
the right-hand side of (6.17) is, as a function of k, (weakly) decreasing on
[0, k1] and (weakly) increasing on [k1,∞); hence it has a minimum at k = k1
and (6.17) implies, using m(k1) = ℓ− k1 − 1 from (6.18),
1
a
> 1 +
S − k1 −m(k1)
m′(k1)
=
S + 1− ℓ+m′(k1)
m′(k1)
(6.20)
and thus
a 6
m′(k1)
S + 1− ℓ+m′(k1) . (6.21)
Conversely, we construct an example with equality in (6.21). Suppose
that a is such that equality holds in (6.21), and thus in (6.20). Let W be
a set of voters with |W| = aV , for a suitable V (so that aV and other
numbers in the construction are integers), let k := k1 and let C1, C2, C3 be
disjoint sets of candidates with |C1| = k, |C2| = ℓ− k, |C3| = S − k. Let each
voter in W vote on A := C1 ∪ C2, and on m(k) candidates from C3, in an
organised way such that each candidate in C3 gets equally many votes from
W, viz. |W|m(k)/(S − k); furthermore, let each voter in Wc vote for m′(k)
candidates from C3, again with evenly spead votes. Then there is equality
in (6.15) and (6.17), and thus in (6.16), which implies that each candidate
in C3 gets exactly aV votes. Thus all candidates in C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 tie with
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aV = |W| votes each, and a possible outcome is E = C1 ∪ C3, which is a bad
outcome for πEJR. Consequently, (6.21) is best possible, i.e.,
π
LV(L)
EJR (ℓ, S) =
m′(k1)
S + 1− ℓ+m′(k1) . (6.22)
The result follows from (6.22) and (6.18)–(6.19). 
Remark 6.13. Note that πBVEJR(ℓ, S) is not monotone in ℓ, cf. Remark 3.8.
In fact, (6.10) shows that πBVEJR(ℓ, S), as a function of ℓ, increases from
πBVEJR(1, S) =
1
2 to a maximum at ℓ = ⌈(S + 1)/2⌉, and then decreases back
to πBVEJR(S, S) =
1
2 . The maximum value is ≈ 23 for large S.
The behaviour of π
LV(L)
PJR (ℓ, S) is similar when L > ⌈(S + 1)/2⌉.
Example 6.14. For S = 3, πBVEJR(1, 3) =
1
2 , π
BV
EJR(2, 3) =
3
5 , π
BV
EJR(3, 3) =
1
2 .
Remark 6.15. As noted above, πBVEJR(S, S) =
1
2 = π
BV
same(S, S). More gener-
ally,
π
LV(L)
PJR (L,S) = π
LV(L)
EJR (L,S) = π
LV(L)
same (L,S), (6.23)
which follows directly from Definitions 6.1 and 6.2, since when ℓ = L, the
assumptions require every voter in W to vote for A.
For Cumulative Vote, the scenarios above are not very interesting, for the
same reason as same; they allow the voters in W to spread their votes over
too many candidates. We state this for the ideal Equal and Even version
CV=, as in Theorem 5.14.
Theorem 6.16. For (ideal) Equal and Even Cumulative Vote:
πCV
=
PJR (ℓ, S) = π
CV=
EJR (ℓ, S) = 1, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (6.24)
Proof. An immediate consequence of Theorems 5.14 and 6.4. 
Remark 6.17. In Definition 6.2, it is not required that ℓ candidates from
the common set
⋂
σ∈W σ ⊇ A are elected. That requirement for ℓ = 1 is
used in the definition of Strong Justified Representation in [1]; similarly, the
weaker version that |σ ∩ E| > ℓ for every σ ∈ W is used in the definition
of Semi-Strong Justified Representation. However, as remarked in [1], these
conditions are too strong, and they cannot be required in general. In our
setting, we might define scenarios SJR and SSJR as in Definition 6.2 but
using these requirements; however, then πMSJR(ℓ, S) = π
M
SSJR(ℓ, S) = 1 for
every election method M and 1 6 ℓ 6 S. To see this, let n > 1 and consider
an election with S + 1 candidates C1, . . . , CS+1 and V = n+ S + 1 votes: n
votes on all candidates and 1 vote on Ai := {Ci, . . . , Ci+ℓ−1} (with indices
mod S + 1) for each i ∈ [S + 1]. Let Wi := {σ : σ ⊇ Ai}. If, for SJR or
SSJR, the outcome is good for Wi, then E ⊇ Ai. This cannot hold for all i,
and thus the outcome is bad for at least one set of voters Wi. Hence,
πMSJR(ℓ, S), π
M
SSJR(ℓ, S) >
|Wi|
V
=
n+ 1
n+ S + 1
, (6.25)
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and the result follows since n is arbitrary. We therefore do not consider
these scenarios.
7. Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered methods
In this section, we continue the study of the thresholds πparty, πtactic, πsame,
πPJR, πEJR for unordered ballots; we now consider Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s
election methods, defined in Appendices A.2.6–A.2.9.
Problem 7.1. Further election methods for unordered ballots are described
and studied in e.g. [26; 1; 41; 8; 16]. Study πparty, πtactic, πsame, πPJR, πEJR for
them!13
7.1. The party list case. We begin with a simple result, presumably
known already to Phragme´n and Thiele.
Theorem 7.2. For Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s unordered methods:
πPhr-uparty (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt
party (ℓ, S) = π
Th-add
party (ℓ, S) = π
Th-elim
party (ℓ, S)
= πD
′H
party(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (7.1)
Proof. It is easy to see that in the party list case, all four methods reduce to
D’Hondt’s method [24, Theorem 11.1], [32], [43]. Hence, the result follows
from (4.3). 
7.2. Phragme´n’s method. For Phragme´n’s unordered method, we have
a simple result. The result for πPhr-usame is shown in [24], and its extension to
πPhr-uPJR in [8].
Theorem 7.3 ([8]). For Phragme´n’s unordered methods:
πPhr-utactic (ℓ, S) = π
Phr-u
same (ℓ, S) = π
Phr-u
PJR (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (7.2)
Proof. Consider first PJR. LetW be a set of voters and A a set of candidates
as in Definition 6.1, and suppose that the outcome is bad. Let A∗ :=⋃
σ∈W σ ⊇ A. Thus each voter in W votes for a set σ with A ⊆ σ ⊆ A∗,
where |A| > ℓ, but k := |A∗ ∩ E| < ℓ. In particular, at least one candidate
in A is not elected.
We use the formulation with loads in Appendix A.2.6, and let t = t(S) be
the final maximum load of a ballot. Say that a ballot with load u has free
voting power t − u; this is the additional load that the ballot may accept
without raising the maximum load t.
The k elected candidates in A∗ ∩ E together give load k, of which some
part may fall on voters not in W. Thus, if ballot i has final load xi,∑
i∈W
xi 6 k 6 ℓ− 1. (7.3)
13 Some inequalities for πPJR and πEJR follow by (6.4)–(6.6) from results in [1; 41; 8]
showing whether or not certain methods satisfy JR, PJR or EJR.
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Furthermore, the total free voting power of the ballots in W is at most 1,
since otherwise another candidate from A \ E would have been elected to
the last place, with a smaller t(S). (This total free voting power may equal
1 if there is a tie for the last seat.) Thus,∑
i∈W
(t− xi) 6 1. (7.4)
Consequently, combining (7.3) and (7.4),
|W|t =
∑
i∈W
xi +
∑
i∈W
(t− xi) 6 ℓ. (7.5)
On the other hand, S−k candidates not in A∗ have been elected, incurring
a total load S − k > S+1− ℓ. Since the ballots in W do not get any of this
load, all of it falls on the V − |W| other ballots, and thus
S + 1− ℓ 6 (V − |W|)t. (7.6)
Combining (7.5) and (7.6) we find
|W|
V − |W| =
|W|t
(V − |W|)t 6
ℓ
S + 1− ℓ , (7.7)
which is equivalent to
|W|
V
6
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.8)
Thus,
πPhr-uPJR (ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.9)
Theorems 5.3 and 6.4 together with (7.9) yield
πPhr-utactic (ℓ, S) 6 π
Phr-u
same (ℓ, S) 6 π
Phr-u
PJR (ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.10)
Hence, Theorem 5.17(v) applies and yields
πPhr-utactic (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.11)
The result follows by (7.10) and (7.11). 
However, it was shown in [8, Example 5] that Phragme´n’s unordered
method does not satisfy EJR, i.e., πPhr-uEJR > ℓ/S > ℓ/(S + 1) is possible.
We may tweak that example a little to the following (found by computer
experiment rather than an analysis).
Example 7.4 (based on [8]). Consider an election by Phragme´n’s unordered
method with S = 12 seats, candidates C = {A,B,C1, . . . , C12}, and 2409
voters voting
200 A,B,C1
209 A,B,C2
600 C1, C2, C3, . . . , C12
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500 C2, C3, . . . , C12
900 C3, . . . , C12
Then, a computer assisted calculation shows that the elected are, in or-
der, C3, C4, C5, C6, C2, C7, C8, C1, C9, C10, C11, C12 (with C3, . . . , C12 tying
throughout; here one possibility is chosen). Hence, if W is the set of the
409 voters on the first two lines, the conditions of EJR are satisfied for ℓ = 2
with A = {A,B}, but the outcome is bad. Consequently,
πPhr-uEJR (2, 12) >
409
2409
>
2
12
=
ℓ
S
>
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.12)
(This is not sharp, and can be improved at least a little.)
Problem 7.5. What is πPhr-uEJR (ℓ, S) in general? Even the case ℓ = 2 and a
given (small) S seems far from trivial.
7.3. Thiele’s optimization method. Aziz et al. [1] showed that Thiele’s
optimization method satisfies EJR; i.e., πTh-optEJR (ℓ, S) < ℓ/S by (6.5). In fact,
the proof can be improved to show the optimal bound ℓ/(S + 1).
Theorem 7.6 ([1], improved). For Thiele’s optimization method: For 1 6
ℓ 6 S,
πTh-opttactic (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt
same (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt
PJR (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt
EJR (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.13)
Proof. Consider an election with a bad outcome E for the scenario EJR in
Definition 6.2. Then not every candidate in A is elected, since otherwise the
outcome would be good, witnessed by any σ ∈ W. Fix some A ∈ A \ E .
For every ballot σ and every elected candidate C ∈ E , let δ(σ,C) be the
change in the satisfaction of σ (see Appendix A.2.7) if A is elected instead
of C, i.e., E is replaced by E ∪{A}\{C}. Let further ∆(σ) :=∑C∈E δ(σ,C).
Since E maximizes the total satisfaction,∑
σ∈V
δ(σ,C) 6 0 (7.14)
for every C ∈ E , and thus∑
σ∈V
∆(σ) =
∑
C∈E
∑
σ∈V
δ(σ,C) 6 0. (7.15)
Consider a ballot σ, and let k := |σ∩E|. Then δ(σ,C) > −1/k if C ∈ σ∩E ,
and δ(σ,C) > 0 if C /∈ σ ∩E . (In both cases with equality if A /∈ σ.) Hence,
∆(σ) > k ·
(
−1
k
)
= −1. (7.16)
Moreover, if σ ∈ W, then A ∈ σ. Hence, δ(σ,C) = 0 if C ∈ σ ∩ E , and
δ(σ,C) = 1/(k + 1) if C /∈ σ ∩ E . Furthermore, k 6 ℓ − 1, since otherwise
the outcome would be good. Hence,
∆(σ) =
S − k
k + 1
>
S + 1− ℓ
ℓ
, σ ∈ W. (7.17)
THRESHOLDS FOR ELECTION METHODS 33
Consequently, using (7.17) for σ ∈ W and (7.16) for σ ∈ Wc,∑
σ∈V
∆(σ) > |W|S + 1− ℓ
ℓ
− |Wc| = |W|S + 1
ℓ
− V. (7.18)
Combining (7.15) and (7.18) we find
0 > |W|S + 1
ℓ
− V (7.19)
and thus
|W|
V
6
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.20)
This holds for every bad outcome, and thus
πTh-optEJR (ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.21)
Combining (7.21) with Theorems 6.4 and 7.2 yields
πTh-optparty (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt
same (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt
PJR (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt
EJR (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.22)
Finally, (7.22) and (5.2) yield
πTh-opttactic (ℓ, S) 6 π
Th-opt
same (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.23)
Hence, Theorem 5.17(v) applies and shows that the inequality (7.23) is an
equality. 
7.4. Thiele’s addition method. The results in Theorems 7.3 and 7.6 do
not hold for Thiele’s addition method. We first give a concrete example by
Tenow [42].
Example 7.7. Consider an election by Thiele’s addition method with S = 3
seats and 50 voters, divided into two parties. Suppose first that all vote along
party lines:
37 ABC
13 KLM
Then Thiele’s method reduces to D’Hondt’s method and the larger party
gets 2 seats and the smaller 1.
However, the larger party may cunningly split their votes on five different
lists as follows:
1 A
9 AB
9 AC
9 B
9 C
13 KLM
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Then A gets the first seat (19 votes), and the next two go to B and C (in
some order) with 13.5 votes each, beating KLM with 13. Thus the large
party gets all seats. (See [24, Example 13.13] for a further discussion.)
For same or PJR with ℓ = 1, this is a bad outcome for the KLM party,
and thus
πTh-addPJR (1, 3) > π
Th-add
same (1, 3) >
13
50
= 0.26 >
1
4
=
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.24)
Moreover, it was shown in [1] that Thiele’s addition method does not
satisfy JR, i.e., by (6.6), that πTh-addPJR > 1/S for some S. In [1], this was
shown for S > 10, by an example; [40; 41] then found the sharp range to be
S > 6, by solving a linear programming problem. The analysis in [40; 41] is
easily modified to give a method for calculating πTh-addPJR (1, S) for any given
S.
For convenience, we let in the remainder of this subsection the “num-
ber of votes” be arbitrary positive real (or at least rational) numbers; see
Remarks 2.2 and 2.3, and note that this does not affect the results since
Thiele’s addition method is homogeneous. This really means that we allow
ballots with weights; in such cases all counts and sums over ballots should
be interpreted accordingly; for convenience we omit this from the notation.
First, consider the problem of electing n candidates C1, . . . , Cn with a
score of at least 1 each, and as few votes as possible, assuming that there
are no other candidates. Denote the minimum total number of votes by αn.
We may compute αn as follows. We may assume that C1, . . . , Cn are
elected in this order. For notational convenience, we identify {C1, . . . , Cn}
with [n]; we thus regard the ballots as subsets of [n], with σ ⊆ [n] interpreted
as a vote on {Ci : i ∈ σ}. Let xσ be the number of votes σ. The condition
that the n elected are C1, . . . , Cn in this order, with scores at least 1, can
then be written as a number of linear inequalities in the 2n− 1 variables xσ,
σ 6= ∅. (We may ignore σ = ∅, which counts blank votes, since these can be
deleted without affecting the outcome.) For example, for n = 3, we obtain
the system
x1, x2, x3, x12, x13, x23, x123 > 0 (7.25)
x1 + x12 + x13 + x123 > x2 + x12 + x23 + x123 (7.26)
x1 + x12 + x13 + x123 > x3 + x13 + x23 + x123 (7.27)
x2 +
1
2x12 + x23 +
1
2x123 > x3 +
1
2x13 + x23 +
1
2x123 (7.28)
x1 + x12 + x13 + x123 > 1 (7.29)
x2 +
1
2x12 + x23 +
1
2x123 > 1 (7.30)
x3 +
1
2x13 +
1
2x23 +
1
3x123 > 1 (7.31)
where (7.26)–(7.27) say that C1 wins over C2 and C3 and thus is elected
first. (At least, in case of a tie, this is possible.) Similarly, (7.28) says that
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C2 is elected before C3. Finally, (7.29)–(7.31) say that C1, C2, C3 all are
elected with scores > 1.14
This leads to the linear programming problem
Minimize x :=
∑
σ
xσ
subject to (7.25)–(7.31), generalized to n candidates. (7.32)
Thus, αn equals the minimum in this linear programming problem.
15
Theorem 7.8. For Thiele’s addition method and ℓ = 1:
πTh-addtactic (1, S) = π
Th-add
same (1, S) = π
Th-add
PJR (1, S) = π
Th-add
EJR (1, S) =
1
1 + αS
,
(7.33)
where αS is given by (7.32).
Proof. This time we show the lower bound first. Let (xσ)σ be a vector
yielding the minimum αS in (7.32), with n = S. Consider an election with
candidates A,B1, . . . , BS , 1 vote on A (this is W), and for each σ ⊆ [S],
xσ votes on the corresponding set of candidates {Bi : i ∈ σ}. Thus the
total number of votes is V = 1 +
∑
σ xσ = 1 + αS . A possible outcome is
{B1, . . . , BS}, which is a bad outcome for W for any of the scenarios same,
PJR, EJR. Thus, using (6.3),
πTh-addEJR (1, S) > π
Th-add
PJR (1, S) > π
Th-add
same (1, S) >
|W|
V
=
1
1 + αS
. (7.34)
To see that this is also a lower bound for πTh-addtactic , regard W as a set of
voters with total weight 1. They may vote in any way, but if we add αS
further votes as above, choosing B := {B1, . . . , BS} disjoint from A∗ :=⋃
σ∈W σ, then the candidates in A∗ will have scores 6 1, and again the bad
outcome {B1, . . . , BS} is possible. Hence,
πTh-addtactic (1, S) >
|W|
V
=
1
1 + αS
. (7.35)
Conversely, consider any election with bad outcome for EJR with ℓ = 1 for
a set W of voters. (Recall that EJR and PJR are the same for ℓ = 1.) This
means that there exists some candidate A that everyone in W has voted
for. Furthermore, if A∗ := ⋃σ∈W σ, then A∗ ∩ E = ∅, i.e., none from A∗
is elected. Hence, if σ ∈ W, then no candidate in σ is ever elected, so σ is
counted with full value throughout the counting. Thus A has score at least
|W| throughout the counting.
14In fact, it is easily seen that (7.29) and (7.30) are redundant, since the scores of the
elected always are non-increasing.
15 Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [40, 41] give an equivalent linear programming problem,
with
∑
σ xσ = 1 and maximizing the score of Cn when elected. Their problem has the
maximum α−1n .
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Let the elected, in order, be B1, . . . , BS . Since Bi ∈ E , we have Bi /∈ A∗
for every i, i.e., no voter inW votes for any Bi. Furthermore, we may delete
all votes from voters in Wc on unelected candidates; this will not affect
the scores of B1, . . . , BS , and not increase the score of anyone else, so the
outcome B := {B1, . . . , BS} is still possible. Hence we may assume that if
σ ∈ Wc, then σ ⊆ B. Moreover, each Bi is elected with score at least the
current score of A, and thus at least |W|.
Consequently, considering only the votes from Wc, we have after scaling
all votes by 1/|W| an election of the type described by (7.32), and thus
|Wc|
|W| > αS . (7.36)
This yields
|W|
V
6
1
1 + αS
(7.37)
for any bad outcome, and thus πTh-addEJR (1, S) 6 1/(1 + αS), which together
with (7.34), (7.35) and (5.2) completes the proof. 
Before considering ℓ > 1, let us study the sequence αn. We begin with
the first values.
Example 7.9. For n = 1, the system (7.25)–(7.31) becomes the trivial
single equation x1 > 1, and thus
α1 = 1. (7.38)
Example 7.10. For n = 2, the system (7.25)–(7.31) becomes
x1, x2, x12 > 0 (7.39)
x1 + x12 > x2 + x12 (7.40)
x1 + x12 > 1 (7.41)
x2 +
1
2x12 > 1. (7.42)
It follows from (7.40) and (7.42) that x1+x2+x12 > 2x2+x12 > 2, and this
is attained by, for example, x1 = x2 = 1, x12 = 0 or x1 = x2 = 0, x12 = 2.
(Consequently, there is no way to split votes tactically when n = 2.) Hence,
α2 = 2. (7.43)
Example 7.11. For n = 3, the linear programming problem (7.32) has (by
Maple) the minimum
α3 = 8/3
.
= 2.667, (7.44)
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with a solution x12 = x13 = x2 = x3 = 2/3 and all other xσ = 0.
16 Conse-
quently,
πTh-addsame (1, 3) = π
Th-add
PJR (1, 3) = π
Th-add
EJR (1, 3) =
1
1 + 8/3
=
3
11
. (7.45)
Note that the solution to the linear programming problem corresponds to
the following election. (Thiele’s addition method, 3 seats.)
3 A
2 B1B2
2 B1B3
2 B2
2 B3
B1, B2, B3 tie for the first seat, and if it goes to B1, then A, B2 and B3 tie
for the remaining two seats, and it is possible that A is not elected. (Note
that the second election in Example 7.7 is an approximation of this example,
with votes multiplied by 4.5, modified to avoid ties.)
Example 7.12. For n = 4, the linear programming problem (7.32) has (by
Maple) the minimum
α4 = 24/7
.
= 3.4286, (7.46)
with one solution x123 = x124 = x13 = x14 = x23 = x24 = x3 = x4 = 3/7
and all other xσ = 0.
17
For n > 5, we do not know the values of αn, and thus not of π
Th-add
same (1, n);
it should be easy to obtain more values by solving the linear programming
problem (7.32) by computer, but we have not done so.18 We have the fol-
lowing general result.
Theorem 7.13. The sequence αn is weakly increasing and subadditive. In
particular,
αn 6 αn+1 6 αn + 1, n > 1. (7.47)
Furthermore,
n
Hn
6 αn 6 n, n > 1, (7.48)
and if n > 3, then αn < n.
16In fact, this is the unique solution. This is easily seen by solving the dual problem,
which leads to considering the linear combination 1
3
·(7.26)+ 1
3
·(7.27)+ 4
3
·(7.28)+ 8
3
·(7.31);
this also verifies (7.44). We omit the details.
17This solution is not unique. For example, another is given by x124 = x13 = 6/7,
x23 = x4 = 4/7, x24 = x3 = 2/7.
18Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [40] report, in our notation, α−1
5
.
= 0.2389 and α−1
6
.
= 0.204,
and thus α5
.
= 4.186 and α6
.
= 4.90, but they do not give exact rational values. See
also the example in Table 1 in the full (arXiv) version of [41], which shows that α6 6
4992/(6103/6) = 29952/6103
.
= 4.908. (This bound is not sharp and can be improved
further.)
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Proof. Let En be the set of all elections of the type used to define αn above.
Given an election in En+1, with C1, . . . , Cn+1 elected in this order, remove
Cn+1 from all ballots. This gives an election in En, and it follows that
αn 6 αn+1.
Similarly, given two elections in Em and En, we may relabel the candidates
and assume that the two elections have disjoint sets of candidates; then their
union is an election in Em+n, and the subadditivity αm+n 6 αm+αn follows.
In particular, since α1 = 1, we have αn+1 6 αn + 1. Induction yields
αn 6 n and, since α3 < 3 by Example 7.11, αn < n for n > 3.
Finally, let w(σ, i) > 0 be the contribution of ballot σ to the score of Ci
when elected. Thus
∑
σ w(σ, i) > 1. On the other hand, if σ is a ballot with
k names, then
∑n
i=1w(σ, i) = Hk 6 Hn. Consequently,
n 6
n∑
i=1
∑
σ
w(σ, i) =
∑
σ
n∑
i=1
w(σ, i) 6
∑
σ
Hn = Hn|V|. (7.49)
Hence |V| > n/Hn, and thus αn > n/Hn. 
Problem 7.14. Find a general formula for αn, and thus for π
Th-add
same (1, S).
Problem 7.15. Find an asymptotic formula for αn as n→∞, and thus for
πTh-addsame (1, S) as S →∞.
The limit limn→∞ αn/n exists since αn is subadditive. We conjecture
that the limit is 0, i.e., αn = o(n); by Theorem 7.8, this is equivalent to
πTh-addsame (1, S)≫ 1/S as S →∞.
Problem 7.16. Prove (or disprove) the conjecture αn/n→ 0 as n→∞.
Remark 7.17. It follows from (7.33) and (6.6) that Thiele’s addition me-
thod satisfies JR for a given S if and only if αS > S − 1. It was shown by
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [40, 41] that this holds if and only if S 6 5, see
Footnote 18 and (7.47).
We return to πTh-add(ℓ, S) for the scenarios above. For ℓ > 1, we can only
prove an inequality, which we conjecture is sharp.
Theorem 7.18. For Thiele’s addition method and 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
πTh-addEJR (ℓ, S) > π
Th-add
PJR (ℓ, S) > π
Th-add
same (ℓ, S) >
ℓ
ℓ+ αS+1−ℓ
, (7.50)
where αn is given by (7.32).
Conjecture 7.19. The inequalities in (7.50) are equalities for PJR and
same, i.e., πTh-addPJR (ℓ, S) = π
Th-add
same (ℓ, S) = ℓ/(ℓ+ αS+1−ℓ).
Proof and discussion. We prove (7.50) by a simple extension of the example
in the proof of Theorem 7.8. Let (xσ)σ be a vector yielding the minimum
αn in (7.32), with n = S + 1 − ℓ. Consider an election with candidates
A1, . . . , Aℓ, B1, . . . , Bn; let W be a set of ℓ votes on A := {A1, . . . , Aℓ},
and let there be for each σ ⊆ [n], xσ votes on the corresponding set of
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candidates {Bi : i ∈ σ}. Thus the total number of votes is V = ℓ+
∑
σ xσ =
ℓ + αS+1−ℓ. A possible outcome is {A1, . . . , Aℓ−1, B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ}, which
is a bad outcome for W for same (and for PJR, EJR). Thus (7.50) follows,
using (6.3).
For the converse, for PJR (or same) we may try to argue in the same way
as for Theorem 7.8. Thus, consider an election with a bad outcome. let again
A∗ := ⋃σ∈W σ, so |E ∩A∗| 6 ℓ−1. Let B := E \A∗, and n := |B| > S+1−ℓ.
Throughout the counting, there is at least one candidate in A that is not
elected, and this candidate has score > |W|/ℓ; hence every elected candidate
is elected with a score > |W|/ℓ; in particular, this holds for the n candidates
in B. We may now delete all candidates not in E . By construction, the voters
in W vote only for candidates in A∗. The problem is that it is possible that
voters in Wc vote not only for candidates in B but also for one or several
candidates in A∗. If this does not happen, then the votes from Wc yield,
after scaling by ℓ/|W|, an election of the type in (7.32), and thus
|Wc| > αnW
ℓ
> αS+1−ℓ
W
ℓ
, (7.51)
which yields the desired estimate
|W|
|V| 6
ℓ
ℓ+ αS+1−ℓ
. (7.52)
However, the voters in Wc are free to also vote for candidates in A∗.
This may decrease the score for some of the candidates in B, which seems
like a bad idea, and we conjecture that the optimal strategy for Wc does
not use votes outside B. However, such votes may change the order in
which the candidates from B are elected, which may change their scores in a
complicated way, so we have not been able to show this conjecture rigorously,
and thus not Conjecture 7.19. Note that voting on candidates from another
party may be a good strategy in some situations, see Example 7.24 below,
so one should be careful, even if that example is of a different type. 
Problem 7.20. Prove (or disprove) Conjecture 7.19.
Example 7.21. Theorem 7.18 and Example 7.11 show that
πTh-addsame (3, 5) >
3
3 + α3
=
3
3 + 8/3
=
9
17
>
1
2
. (7.53)
Thus, with S = 5, there are bad outcomes where A has a majority of
the votes but does not get a majority of the seats. We may construct a
concrete example from the solution to the linear programming problem in
Example 7.11 as follows; cf. the election in Example 7.11. (Thiele’s addition
method, 5 seats.)
9 A1A2A3
2 B1B2
2 B1B3
2 B2
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2 B3
A possible outcome is that the elected are, in order, A1, A2, B1, B2, B3.
Example 7.22. If ℓ 6 S − 2, the S + 1 − ℓ > 3 and Theorem 7.13 yields
αS+1−ℓ < S + 1− ℓ. Hence, Theorem 7.18 yields
πTh-addsame (ℓ, S) >
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S − 2. (7.54)
Similarly, since α6 < 5 as shown by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [40, 41], see
Remark 7.17 and Footnote 18, it follows that if S − ℓ > 5, then αS+1−ℓ <
S − ℓ, and thus Theorem 7.18 yields
πTh-addsame (ℓ, S) >
ℓ
S
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S − 5. (7.55)
To find πTh-addEJR seems even more complicated than to find π
Th-add
PJR or
πTh-addsame , and we have no non-trivial result.
Problem 7.23. Find πTh-addEJR (ℓ, S) for ℓ > 2.
Finally, consider πTh-addtactic . The values xσ in the solution to (7.32) give an
optimal strategy for how a well-organized party should distribute its votes in
order to get n candidates elected, provided the other voters vote for different
candidates. However, Thiele’s addition method is non-monotone, and the
strategy is risky and may be bad if the other voters vote in some other way,
and in particular if another party knows the strategy and may counteract
as in the following example.
Example 7.24 ([24]). Consider again the second election in Example 7.7,
and suppose that two voters in the KLM party also vote for B, by chance
or by clever design because they know the plan of the other party:
1 A
9 AB
9 AC
9 B
9 C
11 KLM
2 BKLM
Then B is elected first, followed by C and finally K (or L or M). Hence the
ABC party gets only 2 seats.
Example 7.24 suggests that the strategy in the linear programming prob-
lem (7.32) is not the best strategy for the scenario tactic, where we consider
the worst-case behaviour of the voters not in W, and thus need a fool-proof
strategy. We do not know the best such strategy, and leave it an open
problem to find it, and the resulting threshold.
Problem 7.25. Find πTh-addtactic (ℓ, S).
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7.5. Thiele’s elimination method. We consider briefly also Thiele’s elim-
ination method.
Theorem 7.26. For Thiele’s elimination method:
πTh-elimtactic (ℓ, S) = π
Th-elim
same (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (7.56)
Proof. We first give an upper bound for πTh-elimsame (ℓ, S). Thus suppose that
W ⊆ V, and that every voter in W votes for the same list A with |A| > ℓ.
Suppose that the outcome is bad for same. This means that less than ℓ
candidates in A remain at the end. Hence, in some round A has ℓ remaining
candidates and one of them, say A, is eliminated.
Consider this round. The eliminated candidate A has score > |W|/ℓ,
and thus every other remaining candidate has at least this score. Let m
be the number of remaining candidates in C \ A. Since the total number of
remaining candidates is > S (otherwise there would be no more elimination),
m > S + 1 − ℓ. Hence, the total score of the candidates in C \ A, T say, is
> (S + 1− ℓ)|W|/ℓ.
A ballot with k remaining candidates contributes 1/k to the score of each
of them, so the total contribution of the ballot is 1, for any k > 1. (And 0
if no candidate on the ballot remains.) Since no voter in W votes for any
candidate in C \ A, it follows that
V − |W| = |Wc| > T > S + 1− ℓ
ℓ
|W|, (7.57)
which implies
|W|
V
6
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.58)
Consequently,
πTh-elimsame (ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S + 1
. (7.59)
Finally, (7.59) and (5.2) yield πTh-elimtactic (ℓ, S) 6 π
Th-elim
same (ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S+1 , and
thus Theorem 5.17(v) yields the equalities (7.56). 
For PJR we give only an example, giving a lower bound for πPJR(1, S)
(and thus for πEJR(1, S)). We do not believe that this example is sharp.
In fact, we do not know whether πTh-elimPJR (ℓ, S) < 1 or not, even in the case
πTh-elimPJR (1, 1).
Example 7.27. Let S,m, n > 1. Consider an election with 1 + mn + S
candidates A, Cij and Bk, for i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], k ∈ [S], and the foillowing
votes:
n+ 1 {A} ∪ {Cij : j ∈ [n]} for every i ∈ [m]
m− 1 {Cij} for every i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n]
m+ n {Bk} for every k ∈ [S].
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The total number of votes is thus
V = m(n+ 1) +mn(m− 1) + S(m+ n) = m(mn+ 1) + S(m+ n).
(7.60)
Initially, A has score m(n+1)n+1 = m, each Cij has score
n+1
n+1+m− 1 = m and
each Bk has score m+ n. Thus either A or some Cij is eliminated; suppose
that A is. In the sequel, every remaining Cij has score 6 n+ 1 +m− 1 =
m+n, and each remainingBk still has scorem+n. We may thus assume that
in each round (after the first) some Cij is eliminated, until only B1, . . . , BS
remain and are elected.
Consider the scenario PJR with ℓ = 1, let A = {A}, and let the voters W
be the m(n + 1) voters in the first line above. Then the election above is a
bad outcome. Hence, for any S,m, n > 1,
πTh-elimPJR (1, S) >
|W|
V
=
m(n+ 1)
m(mn+ 1) + (m+ n)S
. (7.61)
Letting n→∞, we obtain
πTh-elimPJR (1, S) >
m
m2 + S
, m > 1. (7.62)
For a numerical example, with S = 3 andm = 2, and comparing with (7.56),
πTh-elimPJR (1, 3) >
2
7
> πTh-elimsame (1, 3) =
1
4
. (7.63)
Given S > 1, we may thus maximize the right-hand side of (7.62) over
m > 1; the maximum is obtained for m = ⌊√S⌋ or m = ⌈√S⌉. Taking
m = ⌊√S⌋ yields the lower bound
πTh-elimPJR (1, S) >
⌊√S⌋
2S
∼ 1
2
√
S
, as S →∞. (7.64)
In particular, by (6.6), Thiele’s elimination method does not satisfy JR.
Problem 7.28. What is πTh-elimPJR (ℓ, S)?
7.6. Thiele’s optimization method with general weights. We have in
Sections 7.3–7.4 studied Thiele’s optimization and addition methods with
the standard weights wk = 1/k. In this and the next subsection, we extend
some of the results to general weights w = (wk)
∞
0 . Our results are inspired
by, and extend considerably, results by Aziz et al. [1] on the criteria JR and
EJR, see Remarks 7.33 and 7.39.
We assume throughout that w1 = 1 and that w1 > w2 > . . . > 0.
Theorem 7.29. For Thiele’s optimization method with general weights w =
(wk)
∞
0 : For S > 1,
π
Th-opt(w)
same (1, S) = π
Th-opt(w)
PJR (1, S) = π
Th-opt(w)
EJR (1, S) =
1
1 + S/maxk6S(kwk)
(7.65)
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Proof. Consider an election with a bad outcome for EJR. Let A∗ := ⋃σ∈W σ.
Then E ∩ A∗ = ∅; furthermore, there exists a candidate A ∈ A∗ such that
A ∈ σ for every σ ∈ W.
Let the elected be B1, . . . , BS /∈ A∗. We may eliminate all candidates
except A and B1, . . . , BS ; this yields an election with the same bad outcome
E = B := {B1, . . . , BS}. Furthermore, we may delete A from any ballot
not in W; this will not change the total satisfaction Ψ(B), while the total
satisfaction Ψ(C′) for every other set C′ ⊆ {A} ∪ B is decreased or remains
the same. Hence, B still maximizes the total satisfaction, and is thus a
possible outcome which is bad. Note that each voter in W now votes for
{A}, and each voter in Wc for some subset of B.
Suppose that A is elected instead of Bj . This increases the satisfaction of
every σ ∈ W from 0 to w1 = 1. If σ ∈ Wc and Bj ∈ σ, then the satisfaction
of σ decreases from ψ(|σ|) to ψ(|σ| − 1), i.e., by w|σ|. For all other σ ∈ Wc,
the satisfaction remains the same. Hence, the change in total satisfaction
(A.4) is
Ψ
(B \ {Bj} ∪ {A}) −Ψ(B) = |W| − ∑
σ∋Bj
w|σ|. (7.66)
This change is 6 0, since B is elected and thus maximizes the total satisfac-
tion. Summing over j ∈ [S] we thus obtain
0 >
S∑
j=1
(
|W| −
∑
σ∋Bj
w|σ|
)
= S|W| −
∑
σ∈Wc
|σ|w|σ|. (7.67)
Thus,
|W| 6 1
S
∑
σ∈Wc
|σ|w|σ| 6
|Wc|
S
max
16k6S
(|k|wk). (7.68)
which yields
|W|
V
6
1
1 + S/max16k6S
(|k|wk) (7.69)
and thus an upper bound “6” in (7.65).
Conversely, for any k ∈ [S], consider an election with S + 1 candidates
A,B1, . . . , BS . Let W > 2 and let there be V = W + S votes: W votes
on {A} (this is the set W) and 1 vote on each set {Bi, . . . , Bi+k−1} (indices
mod S) for each i ∈ [S].
The sets of S candidates are B := {B1, . . . , BS} and Ai := {A}∪B\{Bi}.
The total satisfaction if these sets are elected are
Ψ(B) = Sψ(k), (7.70)
Ψ(Ai) =W + (S − k)ψ(k) + kψ(k − 1) = Ψ(B) +W − kwk. (7.71)
Hence, if W < kwk, then B is elected, a bad outcome for same. As usual,
we may here let W be a rational number, since we may multiply the votes
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above by the denominator of W . Hence, we obtain
π
Th-opt(w)
same (1, S) >
kwk
kwk + S
=
1
1 + S/(kwk)
. (7.72)
We may now take the maximum over k ∈ [S] to get the inequality “>” for
π
Th-opt(w)
same in (7.65), which by (6.3) completes the proof. 
Theorem 7.30. For Thiele’s optimization method with weights (wk)
∞
0 sat-
ifying wk 6 1/k, k > 1: For S > 1,
π
Th-opt(w)
same (1, S) = π
Th-opt(w)
PJR (1, S) = π
Th-opt(w)
EJR (1, S) =
1
S + 1
. (7.73)
Furthermore,
π
Th-opt(w)
tactic (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (7.74)
In particular, this applies to Thiele’s weak optimization method.
Proof. By assumption, recalling also the standing assumption w1 = 1, we
have maxk(kwk) = 1. Hence, (7.73) follows from Theorem 7.29.
This implies, by (5.2), π
Th-opt(w)
tactic (1, S) 6 π
Th-opt(w)
same (1, S) = 1/(S+1), and
thus (7.74) follows from Theorem 5.17(iv). 
With the weak method, it is for ℓ > 2 obviously a bad strategy to vote on
the same list. One aspect of this is the following trivial result. (Recall that
the proof of (7.74) by Theorem 5.17 uses the same strategy as for SNTV in
Theorem 5.7, with the votes split on different candidates separately.)
Theorem 7.31. For Thiele’s weak optimization method: If 2 6 ℓ 6 S, then
π
Th-opt(weak)
same (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt(weak)
PJR (ℓ, S) = π
Th-opt(weak)
EJR (ℓ, S) = 1. (7.75)
Proof. LetW > 1. Consider an election with S+ℓ−1 candidates A1, . . . , Aℓ,
B1, . . . , BS−1 and V = W + S − 1 votes: W votes on {A1, . . . , Aℓ} (this is
the setW) and 1 vote on each Bi. With Thiele’s weak optimization method
e.g. {A1, B1, . . . , BS−1} is elected, a bad outcome for same. Consequently,
π
Th-opt(weak)
same (ℓ, S) >W/(W +S−1), and the result follows, using (6.3), since
W is arbitrary. 
We can extend Theorem 7.31 to other weights in the form of an inequality.
Theorem 7.32. For Thiele’s optimization method with weights (wk)
∞
0 :
π
Th-opt(w)
EJR (ℓ, S) > π
Th-opt(w)
PJR (ℓ, S) > π
Th-opt(w)
same (ℓ, S)
>
w−1ℓ
w−1ℓ + S + 1− ℓ
=
1
wℓ(S + 1− ℓ) + 1 . (7.76)
Proof. Let W > 1. Consider an election with S + 1 candidates A =
{A1, . . . , Aℓ} and B = {B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ}, and V = W + S + 1 − ℓ votes:
W votes on A (this is the setW) and 1 vote on {Bj} for each j ∈ [S+1− ℓ].
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Let Eˆ be a set of S candidates. Then, the total satisfaction (A.4) if Eˆ is
elected is
Ψ(Eˆ) =
{
Wψ(ℓ) + S − ℓ, Eˆ ⊇ A,
Wψ(ℓ− 1) + S + 1− ℓ, Eˆ 6⊇ A (7.77)
The difference between the two values is(
Wψ(ℓ) + S − ℓ)− (Wψ(ℓ− 1) + S + 1− ℓ) =Wwℓ − 1. (7.78)
Hence, if Wwℓ < 1, then the elected set E 6⊇ A; this is a bad outcome for
same, and thus
π
Th-opt(w)
same >
|W|
V
=
W
W + S + 1− ℓ . (7.79)
We may here (as usual) let W be any rational number < w−1ℓ , since we may
multiply all numbers of votes by its denominator to obtain integer values;
hence, (7.79) holds also if we replace W by w−1ℓ , which yields (7.76), using
also (6.3). 
Remark 7.33. It follows from (7.65) that, as S →∞,
Sπ
Th-opt(w)
PJR (1, S) = Sπ
Th-opt(w)
same (1, S)→ max
k>1
(kwk). (7.80)
In particular, if wk > 1/k for some k, then (7.65) or (7.80) implies that
π
Th-opt(w)
PJR (1, S) > 1/S for large S; thus, by (6.6), JR does not hold.
On the other hand, Theorem 7.30 shows that if wk 6 1/k for every k,
then π
Th-opt(w)
PJR (1, S) < 1/S; thus, by (6.6), JR holds.
Hence, as shown by Aziz et al. [1], JR holds for Th-opt(w) if and only if
wk 6 1/k for every k.
Furthermore, if wk < 1/k for some k, then (7.76) implies π
Th-opt(w)
EJR (k, S) >
π
Th-opt(w)
PJR (k, S) > k/S for large S, and thus Th-opt(w) does not satisfy PJR
or EJR.
Consequently, recalling Theorem 7.6, the standard weights wk = 1/k are
the only weights that yield a method satisfying PJR or EJR. For EJR, this
too was shown in [1]; for PJR it was then shown in [40; 41].
7.7. Thiele’s addition method with general weights. We next study
Thiele’s addition method with general weights w = (wk)
∞
0 . We assume as
above that w1 = 1 and that w1 > w2 > . . . > 0.
Some of the analysis in Section 7.4 extends to this case. Define αn(w)
as in Section 7.4, i.e., as the minimum number of (real-valued) votes in an
election with (exactly) n candidates such that all are elected with scores
> 1. Thus, αn(w) can be computed by a linear programming problem of
the type in (7.25)–(7.31), but with the fractions 1/k replaced by the weights
wk as coefficients. Clearly, for any w,
α1(w) = 1. (7.81)
First, we note that Theorem 7.8 extends, with the same proof.
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Theorem 7.34. For Thiele’s addition method with weights w and ℓ = 1:
π
Th-add(w)
tactic (1, S) = π
Th-add(w)
same (1, S) = π
Th-add(w)
PJR (1, S) = π
Th-add(w)
EJR (1, S)
=
1
1 + αS(w)
, S > 1, (7.82)
where αS(w) is given by the version of (7.32) with weights w.
Also the proof of Theorem 7.13 extends, and yields the following.
Theorem 7.35. The sequence αn(w) is weakly increasing and subadditive.
In particular,
αn(w) 6 αn+1(w) 6 αn(w) + 1, n > 1. (7.83)
Furthermore,
n
ψ(n)
6 αn(w) 6 n, n > 1, (7.84)
where ψ(n) =
∑n
k=1wk. 
Corollary 7.36. For Thiele’s addition method with weights w and ℓ = 1:
For any scenario S = tactic, same,PJR,EJR,
1
S + 1
6 π
Th-add(w)
S
(1, S) 6
1
1 + S/ψ(S)
, S > 1. (7.85)
Proof. By Theorem 7.34 and the inequalities (7.84). 
For the weak method, we have a simple result.
Theorem 7.37. For Thiele’s weak addition method and ℓ = 1: For any
scenario S = tactic, same,PJR,EJR,
π
Th-add(weak)
S
(1, S) =
1
S + 1
, S > 1. (7.86)
Proof. For the weak method, ψ(n) = 1 for n > 1, and thus (7.84) yields
αn(weak) = n, n > 1. (7.87)
Thus the result follows by Theorem 7.34 (or Corollary 7.36). 
Example 7.38. For n = 2, the system (7.25)–(7.31) with weights becomes,
after deleting a redundant inequality, cf. Footnote 14,
x1, x2, x12 > 0 (7.88)
x1 + x12 > x2 + x12 (7.89)
x2 +w2x12 > 1. (7.90)
Here (7.89) simplifies to x1 > x2. It is clear that the minimum α2(w) of
x1 + x2 + x12 is obtained with 0 6 w2x12 6 1 (otherwise we could decrease
x12), and that we have equalities in (7.89) and (7.90) (otherwise we could
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decrease x1 or x2, respectively). Hence, the optimum is given by x1 = x2 =
1− w2x12, and we obtain
α2(w) = min
06x6w−1
2
(
2(1 − w2x) + x
)
= min
(
2, w−12
)
=
{
2, 0 6 w2 6
1
2 ,
w−12 ,
1
2 6 w2 6 1.
(7.91)
Theorem 7.34 and (7.91) yield, for S = tactic, same,PJR,EJR,
π
Th-add(w)
S
(1, 2) =
{
1
3 , 0 6 w2 6
1
2 ,
w2
1+w2
, 12 6 w2 6 1.
(7.92)
Remark 7.39. Theorem 7.37 shows in particular, by (6.6), that JR holds
for Thiele’s weak addition method. This was shown by Aziz et al. [1], who
also proved that JR does not hold for any other weights. We show this in
Example 7.40 below.
Example 7.40. Suppose w 6= weak; in other words (by our assumptions on
w) that w2 > 0.
Consider an election with n > 2 candidates C0, . . . , Cn−1, n seats, and
(n−1)2 votes: 1 vote for {C0, Ci} and n−2 votes for {Ci} for each i ∈ [n−1].
All candidates tie with n−1 votes each. If C0 is elected first, then the others
are all elected with scores n− 2 + w2. Hence,
αn(w) 6
(n− 1)2
n− 2 +w2 = n−
nw2 − 1
n− 2 + w2 . (7.93)
In particular, αn(w) < n if n > 1/w2. (Cf. the precise Example 7.11 and
the final claim in Theorem 7.13 for the standard weights.)
Furthermore, by subadditivity (Theorem 7.35), for any m > 1,
αmn(w) 6 mαn(w) 6 mn−m nw2 − 1
n− 2 + w2 . (7.94)
In particular, for any w 6= weak, we can choose first n such that αn(w) <
n, and then m such that αmn(w) < mn − 1. Then, with S := mn, Theo-
rem 7.34 shows that
π
Th-add(w)
PJR (1, S) >
1
S
. (7.95)
Consequently, by (6.6), JR does not hold for Thiele’s addition method with
weights w 6= weak.
For ℓ > 1, we have even for the standard weights in Section 7.4 only
partial results. Theorem 7.18 extends to general weights.
Theorem 7.41. For Thiele’s addition method with weights w and 1 6 ℓ 6
S,
π
Th-add(w)
EJR (ℓ, S) > π
Th-add(w)
PJR (ℓ, S) > π
Th-add(w)
same (ℓ, S) >
w−1ℓ
w−1ℓ + αS+1−ℓ(w)
.
(7.96)
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If wℓ = 0, this is interpreted as
π
Th-add(w)
EJR (ℓ, S) = π
Th-add(w)
PJR (ℓ, S) = π
Th-add(w)
same (ℓ, S) = 1. (7.97)

Proof. The same as for Theorem 7.18, taking w−1ℓ votes on A if wℓ > 0, and
otherwise an arbitrary number. 
In particular, (7.97) holds for Thiele’s weak addition method. For the
weak method, we have also a simple result for πtactic.
Theorem 7.42. For Thiele’s weak addition method:
π
Th-add(weak)
tactic (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (7.98)
Furthermore, if 2 6 ℓ 6 S, then
π
Th-add(weak)
same (ℓ, S) = π
Th-add(weak)
PJR (ℓ, S) = π
Th-add(weak)
EJR (ℓ, S) = 1. (7.99)
Proof. First, (7.99) is a special case of (7.97).
Furthermore, (7.98) follows from Theorems 7.37 and 5.17(iv). 
8. Ordered ballots: PSC and STV
In this section we consider election methods with ordered ballots. First,
recall that πparty, πsame and πtactic in Definitions 4.11, 5.1 and 5.2 apply to
ordered ballots too, and that the inequalities in Theorem 5.3 hold.
Furthermore, let us return to DPC and PSC, used as an example in
Section 1, and define the corresponding threshold. (We use PSC to denote
it, since PSC is used in recent literature, e.g. [15] and [2].)
Definition 8.1 (PSC, ordered ballots: πPSC). Suppose that all voters in W
put the same m > ℓ candidates (not necessarily in the same order) as the
top m candidates in their preference listings. A good outcome is when at
least ℓ of these candidates are elected.
As said in Section 1, the Droop Proportionality Criterion (DPC) formu-
lated by Woodall [46] is equivalent to πPSC(ℓ, S) 6 ℓ/(S + 1).
Furthermore, Tideman [44] formulated what he called “proportionality for
solid coalitions” (PSC), which easily is seen to be equivalent to πPSC(ℓ, S) 6
ℓ/S−, and thus in practice to πPSC(ℓ, S) < ℓ/S for ℓ < S, cf. “Theo-
rem” 3.9.19
DPC and PSC are properties satisfied by STV, see Theorem 8.6 below,
but more or less only by STV; the properties depend on the possibility of
19Tideman [44] refers to Dummett [14, p. 282], and attributes both the property and
the name “proportionality for solid coalitions” to him. This seems inaccurate. Dummett
[14, pp. 282–283] discusses this type of property, but he does not give it a name (and does
not use the term “solid coalition” used by Tideman [44]). Moreover, Dummett [14] talks
about (in our notation) a set of ℓQ voters, where Q is the quota, so ignoring effects of
rounding the quota, Dummett’s property is the same as DPC in Woodall [46], and is thus
essentially equivalent to πPSC(ℓ, S) 6 ℓ/(S + 1). See also Theorem 8.6.
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eliminations in the election method, so that, in Definition 8.1 (for sufficiently
large |W|), even if the votes ofW are split on a large numberm of candidates,
they will by eliminations be concentrated on (at least) ℓ candidates that
become elected. For election methods without eliminations, for example
Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s, this does not happen, and even a large set of
voters W may fail to be represented by splitting their votes on too many
candidates, even in the scenario PSC in Definition 8.1 above, see the trivial
result in Theorem 9.3 below. Therefore, also a weak version of PSC requiring
m = ℓ has been studied, e.g. by Aziz and Lee [2]. This leads to the following
definition.
Definition 8.2 (weak PSC, ordered ballots: πwPSC). Suppose that all voters
in W put the same ℓ candidates (not necessarily in the same order) as the
top ℓ candidates in their preference listings. A good outcome is when all
these candidates are elected.
Remark 8.3. The property called “weak q-PSC” in Aziz and Lee [2] is, with
q = κV , equivalent to πwPSC(ℓ, S) < ℓκ, or, more precicely, see Remark 2.8,
πwPSC(ℓ, S) 6 (ℓκ)−. Furthermore, the property called “Proportionality for
Solid Coalitions” in [15] uses this (weak) version (and is the same as weak
(V/S)-PSC in [2]); hence it is in our notation πwPSC(ℓ, S) 6 (ℓ/S)− (or, in
practice, πwPSC(ℓ, S) < ℓ/S, ℓ < S).
20 Moreover, three further definitions in
[15] also fit the weak version: “Solid coalitions” is the special case ℓ = 1:
πwPSC(1, S) < 1/S; “Unanimity” is the case ℓ = S: πwPSC(S, S) 6 1−;
“Fixed Majority” is πwPSC(S, S) 6 1/2.
Theorem 8.4. For any election method with ordered ballots, and 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
πparty(ℓ, S) 6 πsame(ℓ, S) 6 πwPSC(ℓ, S) 6 πPSC(ℓ, S). (8.1)
Proof. The first inequality is (5.1) in Theorem 5.3.
The second inequality follows since an instance of the scenario same also
is an instance of wPSC, and if it is bad for same then it is bad for wPSC.
Similarly, the third inequality follows because an instance of wPSC with
bad outcome is an instance of PSC with bad outcome. 
Dummett [14] and Woodall [46] both stress that STV satisfies the DPC
type of property. In our notation, we can state their results as
πSTVPSC (ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S + 1
, (8.2)
if the Droop quota is used and we ignore rounding. More precisely, [46]
assumes that the unrounded Droop quota V/(S +1) is used, and then (8.2)
holds. On the other hand, [14] assumes that the quota Q is larger (as it
usually is in practice), and states the result that ℓQ voters are enough to
20 As remarked by [2], [15] inaccurately attributes this weak version of PSC to Dum-
mett [14]; furthermore, [15] says that Dummett’s original proposal is, in our notation,
πwPSC(ℓ, S) 6 (ℓ/S)−. This seems to be doubly inaccurate, since Dummett [14, p. 283]
uses the stronger PSC and the threshold ℓQ/V ≈ ℓ/(S + 1), see Footnote 19.
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guarantee ℓ seats. This, in fact, holds for any quota Q > V/(S + 1), and
can be stated as follows.
Theorem 8.5 (Dummett [14]). Any (reasonable) version of STV with quota
Q = rV , where r > 1/(S + 1), satisfies
πSTVPSC (ℓ, S) < rℓ, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (8.3)
Thus, a set W of at least ℓQ voters forming a “solid coalition” in the sense
of PSC will get at least ℓ of its candidates elected.
This is easy to see directly, but we instead prove the following more precise
result, yielding Theorem 8.5 as a corollary.
Theorem 8.6. Consider any (reasonable) version of STV with quota Q =
V/(S + δ), where δ ∈ [0, 1], Then, for 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
πSTVparty(ℓ, S) = π
STV
same(ℓ, S) = π
STV
wPSC(ℓ, S) = π
STV
PSC (ℓ, S)
=
ℓ(S + 2− ℓ)− 1 + δ
(S + δ)(S + 2− ℓ) =
ℓ
S + δ
− 1− δ
(S + δ)(S + 2− ℓ)
=
ℓ
S + 1
+
(1− δ)(ℓ − 1)(S + 1− ℓ)
(S + δ)(S + 1)(S + 2− ℓ) , (8.4)
πSTVtactic(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (8.5)
As a special case,
πSTVparty(1, S) = π
STV
tactic(1, S) = π
STV
same(1, S) = π
STV
wPSC(1, S) = π
STV
PSC (1, S) =
1
S + 1
.
(8.6)
In particular, with the (unrounded) Droop quota Q = V/(S + 1),
πSTVparty(ℓ, S) = π
STV
tactic(ℓ, S) = π
STV
same(ℓ, S) = π
STV
wPSC(ℓ, S) = π
STV
PSC (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
.
(8.7)
Furthermore, also with a rounded Droop quota Q = V/(S + 1) + O(1) with
Q > V/(S + 1),
πSTVparty(ℓ, S) = π
STV
tactic(ℓ, S) = π
STV
same(ℓ, S) = π
STV
wPSC(ℓ, S) = π
STV
PSC (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
.
(8.8)
Proof. In the party list case, it is easy to see that STV becomes equiva-
lent to the quota method with quota Q, which we denote by Q(δ). Hence
πSTVparty(ℓ, S) = π
Q(δ)
party(ℓ, S), which is given by (4.8). Consequently, recalling
also the general inequalities (8.1), to prove (8.4), it remains only to show
that πSTVPSC (ℓ, S) 6 π
STV
party(ℓ, S). In other words, somewhat informally, we want
to show that the worst case in the party list case (or, equivalently, for the
quota method), also is the worst case for PSC.
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Thus, consider an instance of PSC with a bad outcome, and let A be the
set of m = |A| > ℓ common top candidates for W; thus, at most ℓ− 1 of the
candidates in A are elected. Let D := E \ A, so |D| > S + 1− ℓ.
Suppose that during some stage of the counting process, there are exactly
ℓ candidates in A that have not yet been eliminated, and that the next event
is that one of these, say A1, is eliminated. Let k 6 ℓ− 1 be the number of
candidates from A elected so far; thus there are ℓ−k > 0 candidates from A
still remaining (including A1). Let further m be the number of candidates
in C \A that have been elected so far. There are also at least S +1− ℓ−m
remaining candidates in C\A, since otherwise all remaining candidates would
be elected, and thus |A ∩ E| = ℓ, contrary to our assumption.
Let x be the current number of votes counted for A1. Thus x < Q, since
A1 is not elected. Since there is still at least one remaining candidate from
A, the (remaining) ballots inW are all counted for some candidate in A (by
the assumption in PSC). Each elected candidate accounts for Q votes, and
each of the ℓ− k− 1 remaining candidate besides A1 has currently less than
Q votes; hence
|W| 6 kQ+ (ℓ− k − 1)Q+ x = (ℓ− 1)Q+ x (8.9)
and thus
x > |W| − (ℓ− 1)Q. (8.10)
Similarly, the m elected candidates in C \ A account for mQ votes, and the
at least S + 1 − ℓ −m remaining candidates in C \ A have at least x votes
each (otherwise A1 would not be the next to be eliminated). Thus, since so
far only votes from Wc are counted for candidates in C \ A,
|Wc| > mQ+ (S + 1− ℓ−m)x > (S + 1− ℓ)x
> (S + 1− ℓ)(|W| − (ℓ− 1)Q). (8.11)
Consequently,
V = |W|+ |Wc| > (S + 2− ℓ)|W| − (S + 1− ℓ)(ℓ− 1)Q. (8.12)
and thus, recalling Q = V/(S + δ),
|W|
V
6
1
S + 2− ℓ +
(ℓ− 1)(S + 1− ℓ)
(S + δ)(S + 2− ℓ) (8.13)
Note that the right-hand side of (8.13) equals, by simple algebra, πSTVparty(ℓ, S) =
π
Q(δ)
party(ℓ, S) given by (4.8).
We have shown that if the number of elected + remaining candidates
from A drops below ℓ, then (8.13) must hold. Suppose now that there is
a bad outcome such that this does not happen. Then there is at least one
remaining candidate from A throughout the counting, so votes from W are
only counted for candidates in A. Furthermore, all S elected have to reach
the quota, since otherwise at the end all remaining candidates would have
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been elected. In particular, at least S + 1 − ℓ candidates from C \ A are
elected with Q votes each, all coming from Wc, and thus
|Wc| > (S + 1− ℓ)Q. (8.14)
Hence,
|W| = V − |Wc| 6 V − (S + 1− ℓ)Q = (S + δ)Q − (S + 1− ℓ)Q
= (ℓ+ δ − 1)Q 6 ℓQ. (8.15)
It follows from (8.15) and (8.14) that (8.10) and (8.11) hold with x = Q;
thus (8.12) and (8.13) hold in this case too.
We have shown that (8.13) holds for every bad outcome. Consequently,
πSTVPSC (ℓ, S) 6 π
STV
party(ℓ, S), which completes the proof of (8.4).
For πSTVtactic, consider first the case ℓ = 1, where by (5.2) and (8.4),
πSTVtactic(1, S) 6 π
STV
same(1, S) =
1
S + 1
. (8.16)
Hence, (8.5) follows by Theorem 5.17(iv).
We immediately obtain as special cases, taking ℓ = 1 or δ = 1, (8.6) and
(8.7) with πtactic replaced by πtactic. The equalities for πtactic in (8.6) and
(8.7) then follow from (2.3) and (5.2), cf. (8.16).
Finally, if Q = V/(S+1)+O(1), define δ := V/Q−S, so that Q = V/(S+
δ), and note that δ 6 1 and δ = 1+o(1) as V →∞. Hence, (8.4) implies, for
any of the scenarios there, that for a bad outcome, |W|/V 6 ℓ/(S+1)+o(1)
as V →∞, and thus πSTV(ℓ, S) 6 ℓ/(S + 1). A corresponding lower bound
follows easily by the party case, and thus (8.8) follows. 
Proof of Theorem 8.5. Let δ := 1/r − S < 1, so r = 1/(S + δ). Then, (8.4)
holds and implies (8.3). 
9. Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods
We continue the study of the thresholds πparty, πtactic, πsame, πwPSC, πPSC
for election methods with ordered ballots. In this section we consider Phrag-
me´n’s and Thiele’s election methods, see Appendices A.3.2 and A.3.3; in
Section 10 we study Borda methods.
Problem 9.1. Further election methods for ordered ballots are described
and studied in e.g. [15; 16; 2]. Study πparty, πtactic, πsame, πwPSC, πPSC for
them!21
21 Some inequalities for πPSC and πwPSC follow from results in [15; 2]. showing whether
or not certain methods satisfy (weak) PSC and some related criteria, see Remark 8.3.
THRESHOLDS FOR ELECTION METHODS 53
9.1. Two simple cases. We note first that in the party list case, we have
the same result as for Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods for unordered bal-
lots, Theorem 7.2.
Theorem 9.2. For Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods:
πPhr-oparty (ℓ, S) = π
Th-o
party(ℓ, S) = π
D′H
party(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (9.1)
Proof. It is easy to see that in the party list case, both methods reduce
to D’Hondt’s method [24, Theorem 11.1]. Hence, the result follows from
(4.3). 
Next we note that, as said in Section 8, Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s methods
do not satisfy any PSC condition, since they do not eliminate candidates.
Theorem 9.3. For Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s ordered methods:
πPhr-oPSC (ℓ, S) = π
Th-o
PSC (ℓ, S) = 1, 1 6 ℓ 6 S. (9.2)
Proof. Consider an election where each voter in W also is a candidate, and
votes for herself first, followed by all others in W (in any order). Suppose
also that there are S other candidates B, and 2S other voters Wc, with each
candidate in B being the first and only name on 2 ballots fromWc. This fits
the scenario PSC, provided |W| > ℓ, and obviously both Phragme´n’s and
Thiele’s methods will elect B, which is a bad outcome. Hence,
πPhr-oPSC (ℓ, S), π
Th-o
PSC (ℓ, S) >
|W|
|W|+ 2S (9.3)
for any |W| > ℓ, and the result follows. 
We will see below (Theorem 9.4 and Corollary 9.12) that the weak PSC
πwPSC(ℓ, S) < ℓ/S is satisfied by Phragme´n’s method but not by Thiele’s.
9.2. Phragme´n’s ordered method. Phragme´n’s method has the optimal
result for weak PSC, as well as for the scenarios same and tactic.
Theorem 9.4 ([24]). For Phragme´n’s ordered method: For 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
πPhr-oparty (ℓ, S) = π
Phr-o
tactic (ℓ, S) = π
Phr-o
same (ℓ, S) = π
Phr-o
wPSC(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (9.4)
Proof. The result for πPhr-oparty is in Theorem 9.2.
We next show the upper bound for πPhr-owPSC. This follows by almost the
same proof as for Theorem 7.3.
Let W be a set of voters and A a set of candidates as in Definition 8.2.
Thus |A| = ℓ and each voter inW votes for the set A in some order, possibly
followed by some other candidates. Suppose that the outcome is bad, i.e.,
k := |A ∩ E| < ℓ; in other words, at least one candidate in A is not elected.
We use the formulation with loads in Appendix A.3.2, and let t = t(S) be
the final maximum load of a ballot. Let xi be the final load on ballot i, and
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let, as in the proof of Theorem 7.3, the free voting power of the ballot be
t− xi.
The k elected candidates in A∩E together give load k. Voters in W have
not contributed to the election of any other candidate, and thus has no load
from any other candidate. Thus (7.3) holds.
Since at least one candidate in A is not elected, each ballot in A has when
the election finishes a current top candidate that belongs to A\E . The total
free voting power assigned to each candidate is at most 1, since otherwise
this candidate would have been elected in the last step (if not earlier), with
a lower t(S). Hence, we have, instead of (7.4),∑
i∈W
(t− xi) 6 |A \ E| = ℓ− k, (9.5)
but this is, combined with (7.3), enough to yield (7.5).
The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 7.3 now gives (7.6)–(7.8),
and thus
πPhr-owPSC(ℓ, S) 6
ℓ
S + 1
. (9.6)
Next, (9.6), the result for πPhr-oparty , and (8.1) imply the result in (9.4) for
πPhr-osame and π
Phr-o
wPSC.
Finally, this shows by (5.2) that πPhr-otactic(ℓ, S) 6 ℓ/(S + 1). Equality holds
by Theorem 5.17(v). 
9.3. Thiele’s ordered method. Although Theorem 9.2 for party lists
holds for Thiele’s method as well as for Phragme´n’s, Theorem 9.4 does not;
the reason is that Thiele’s method invites to tactical voting, where a party
may gain seats by a splitting their votes on different (carefully chosen) lists.
Cf. Section 7.4 where the same phenomen is seen for Thiele’s addition me-
thod for unordered ballots. We give first one example from the commission
report [19].
Example 9.5. Thiele’s ordered method with S = 2 seats, and 100 voters
voting
61 AB
39 CD
It is easy to see that AC are elected. (This is a party list case.)
However, suppose that instead the larger party split their votes as follows:
41 AB
20 B (or BA)
39 CD
Then, the first seat goes to A; for the second seat, B has 41/2 + 20 = 40.5
votes, and beats C. Elected: AB.
Thus, if W is the set of 39 CD voters, W gets no candidate elected. This
is an instance of same (and thus of wPSC) for ℓ = 1 and S = 2 with a bad
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outcome. Hence,
πTh-owPSC(1, 2) > π
Th-o
same(1, 2) >
39
100
= 0.39 >
ℓ
S + 1
. (9.7)
We can calculate the thresholds exactly for Thiele’s ordered method. We
begin with some preliminaries. For convenience, we let in the remainder of
this section, as in Section 7.4, the “number of votes” be arbitrary positive
real numbers; see Remarks 2.2 and 2.3, and note that this does not affect
the results since the method is homogeneous.
When, as in the next lemma, we do not specify the number of seats S,
we just assume that it is large enough.
Lemma 9.6. Let an, n > 1, be the smallest total number of (real-values)
votes in an election by Thiele’s ordered method where there are n candidates
A1, . . . , An, and no others, and each of them is elected with score at least 1.
(i) Consider an election by Thiele’s ordered method where there are n
candidates A1, . . . , An, and perhaps others, and each Ai is elected with
score at least t > 0. Let W be the number of voters that have voted for
at least one of A1, . . . , An. Then W > ant.
(ii) Define also a sequence bn, n > 1, by the recursion
bn := 1−
n−1∑
i=1
bi
n+ 1− i , n > 1, (9.8)
or, equivalently,
n∑
i=1
bi
n+ 1− i = 1, n > 1. (9.9)
Then
an =
n∑
i=1
bi. (9.10)
Furthermore, an and bn are given by the Taylor coefficients
an = [z
n]
z2
−(1− z)2 log(1− z) , (9.11)
bn = [z
n]
z2
−(1− z) log(1− z) . (9.12)
Asymptotically, as n→∞,
an ∼ n
log n
, (9.13)
bn ∼ 1
log n
. (9.14)
The first numbers an and bn are given in Table 1.
Before proving Lemma 9.6, we prove a technical result.
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6
an 1
3
2
23
12
55
24
1901
720
4277
1440
bn 1
1
2
5
12
3
8
251
720
95
288
cn 1 2 4 6 9 12
Table 1. The numbers an, bn and cn in Lemmas 9.6 and 9.9.
Lemma 9.7. The numbers bn defined by (9.8) form a strictly decreasing
sequence with 0 < bn 6 1.
Proof. We first give a simple proof by induction that bn > 0 (although this
also follows from the argument below). Thus, assume n > 1 and b1, . . . , bn >
0. Then, by (9.9),
n∑
i=1
bi
n+ 2− i <
n∑
i=1
bi
n+ 1− i = 1, (9.15)
and thus (9.8) yields bn+1 > 0, completing the induction proof.
Thus bn > 0, and hence bn 6 1 by (9.8).
To show that bn is decreasing is (as far as we know) less elementary. Let
B(z) :=
∞∑
n=1
bnz
n (9.16)
be the generating function of bn. Since − log(1− z) =
∑
m>1 z
m/m, (9.9) is
equivalent to
− log(1− z)B(z) =
∞∑
n=2
zn =
z2
1− z (9.17)
and thus
B(z) = − z
2
(1− z) log(1− z) . (9.18)
Let b0 := 0 and
C(z) :=
∞∑
n=1
(
bn−1 − bn
)
zn = (z − 1)B(z) = z
2
log(1− z) . (9.19)
Note that C(z) is (extends to) an analytic function in D := C \ [1,∞).
Thus, Cauchy’s integral formula yields, for any simple closed curve γ in D
that encircles 0 in the positive direction,
bn−1 − bn = 1
2πi
∮
γ
C(z)
dz
zn+1
=
1
2πi
∮
γ
z1−n
log(1− z) dz. (9.20)
Let ε > 0 andR > 1, and let γ consist of: an arc on the circle |z| = √R2 + ε2,
going from R + εi to R − εi in the positive direction; the straight line from
R − εi to 1 − εi; the semicircle {1 + εe−it : π2 6 t 6 3π2 }; the straight line
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from 1 + εi to R+ εi. For n > 2, we then let first ε → 0 and then R →∞,
and obtain, using simple estimates for the circular parts,
bn−1 − bn = 1
2πi
(∫ 1
∞
x1−n dx
log(x− 1) + πi +
∫ ∞
1
x1−n dx
log(x− 1)− πi
)
=
∫ ∞
1
x1−n dx
log2(x− 1) + π2 . (9.21)
This proves that bn−1 − bn > 0 for n > 2, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 9.6. We begin by giving a good strategy; we will later show
that it is optimal. (The strategy used by the AB party in Example 9.5 is
an example, apart from rounding to integers.)
Consider an election with bi votes for AiAi+1 · · ·An, for each i 6 n. (Note
that bi > 0 by Lemma 9.7.) The total number of votes is ân :=
∑n
i=1 bi.
We claim that, by induction, A1, . . . , An will be elected in this order with
score 1 each. (Assuming S > n.) In fact, if A1, . . . , Ak−1 already have been
elected, then Ak has score, using (9.9),
k∑
i=1
bi
k − i+ 1 = 1, (9.22)
while if j > k, then Aj has score bj < 1. Hence Ak is elected next, which
verifies the induction step. Thus an 6 ân.
Conversely, consider an arbitrary election as in (i). Let W be the set
of voters that have voted for some Ai. Consider a ballot σ. Suppose that
there are m candidates Ai ∈ A that are elected with the help of σ, i.e. the
candidates Ai ∈ σ ∩ E such that all candidates before Ai on σ are elected
beforeAi. Let these candidates byAi1 , . . . , Aim , with 1 6 i1 < i2 < · · · < im,
and let their positions on the ballot σ be j1, . . . , jm. Note that 1 6 j1 <
· · · < jm, since A1, . . . , An are elected in order. Define the weight w(σ, i) for
i ∈ [n] by
w(σ, ik) :=
1
jk
bn+1−ik , (9.23)
w(σ, i) := 0, i /∈ {i1, . . . , ik}. (9.24)
If i = ik, then the ballot σ is worth 1/jk votes when Ai is elected. Thus,
for each i ∈ [n], w(σ, i) equals bn+1−i times the score contributed by σ to
the election of Ai; hence,
∑
σ w(σ, i) is bn+1−i times the score of Ai when
elected, and thus, noting that w(σ, i) = 0 unless σ ∈ W,∑
σ∈W
w(σ, i) =
∑
σ∈V
w(σ, i) > bn+1−i. (9.25)
On the other hand, returning to the ballot σ, since i1 < · · · < im 6 n, we
have ik 6 n−m+k and thus n+1−ik > m+1−k. Hence, using Lemma 9.7,
bn+1−ik 6 bm+1−k. (9.26)
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Furthermore, jk > k. Hence, the total weight on σ is, using also (9.9),
n∑
i=1
w(σ, i) =
m∑
k=1
w(σ, ik) =
m∑
k=1
1
jk
bn+1−ik 6
m∑
k=1
1
k
bm+1−k = 1. (9.27)
Consequently, summing (9.27) over σ ∈ W and (9.25) over i,
W = |W| =
∑
σ∈W
1 >
∑
σ∈W
n∑
i=1
w(σ, i) >
n∑
i=1
bn+1−i = ân. (9.28)
In particular, the definition of an shows an > ân, and thus an = ân, which
is (9.10). (Thus, the strategy given above is optimal.) Hence, (9.28) also
shows (i), using homogeneity.
Finally, (9.12) follows by (9.16) and (9.18), and (9.11) by (9.10) and
(9.18). The asymptotic formulas (9.13)–(9.14) follow by (9.11)–(9.12) and
singularity analysis, see [18, Theorem VI.2]. 
Remark 9.8. By summing (9.21) for n > i + 1, and then summing again
for i = 1, . . . k, we obain the integral formulas
bn =
∫ ∞
1
x1−n dx
(x− 1)(log2(x− 1) + π2) , (9.29)
an =
∫ ∞
1
x(1− x−n) dx
(x− 1)2(log2(x− 1) + π2) . (9.30)
It is also possible to derive (9.13)–(9.14) from these.
Lemma 9.9. Let cn, n > 1, be the smallest real number such that in any
election by Thiele’s ordered method where there are n candidates A1, . . . , An,
and each voter votes for all of them in some order, each Ai is elected with
score at least 1. Then
cn =
⌊n+ 1
2
⌋⌈n+ 1
2
⌉
=
{
m2, n = 2m− 1,
m(m+ 1), n = 2m.
(9.31)
The first numbers cn are given in Table 1.
Proof. Consider any election with n candidates A1, . . . , An, and each of the
V voters voting for all of them in some order. When k > 0 of the candidates
have been elected, there are n− k candidates left, and each ballot is worth
at least 1/(k+1), so at least one candidate has score > V/
(
(k+1)(n− k)).
Conversely, for a given k ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}, consider an election where each
voter votes for A1, . . . , Ak in order followed by the remaining candidates
in some order, with each of the remaining candidates in place k + 1 by
V/(n− k) voters. Then, in round k+1, each remaining candidate has score
V/
(
(k + 1)(n− k)).
It follows that cn is given by
min
06k<n
cn
(k + 1)(n − k) = 1, (9.32)
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and thus
cn = max
06k<n
(k + 1)(n − k). (9.33)
The maximum is attained for k = ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋, and (9.31) follows. 
Lemma 9.10. Consider an election by Thiele’s ordered method where there
are n candidates A1, . . . , An, and perhaps others, and each Ai is elected with
score at least t > 0. Add an arbitrary set on new votes (and perhaps new
candidates). Then, throughout the counting, as long as not all candidates
Ai have been elected, at least one of them has score > t.
Proof. This is perhaps not completely obvious since the order in which
A1, . . . , An are elected might be changed. Thus, consider some round in the
new election (after adding ballots). If Aj is the first candidate in A := {Ai}
not yet elected, so A1, . . . , Aj−1 (and possibly some others) already are
elected, then Aj has at least the same score as when Aj was elected in
the original election (without extra ballots), which is > t. Hence, until all of
A have been elected, there is always at least one of them with score > t. 
Theorem 9.11. Let an be as in Lemma 9.6 and cn as in Lemma 9.9. Then,
for Thiele’s ordered method: For 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
πTh-otactic(ℓ, S) =
aℓ
aℓ + aS+1−ℓ
, (9.34)
πTh-osame(ℓ, S) =
ℓ
ℓ+ aS+1−ℓ
, (9.35)
πTh-owPSC(ℓ, S) =
cℓ
cℓ + aS+1−ℓ
. (9.36)
Some numerical values are given in Tables 8–10 in Appendix B.
Proof. We show the three equation using separate but similar arguments.
Let A = {A1, . . . , Aℓ} be a set of ℓ candidates, and let W be a set of
W := |W| voters.
πsame: Suppose that the set W of voters vote on the same list σ, be-
ginning with A1 · · ·Aℓ. Suppose also that the outcome is bad; then not
all of A1, . . . , Aℓ are elected. We may then assume that σ = A1 · · ·Aℓ,
since deleting later names will not affect the counting. Furthermore, at
least S− ℓ+1 other candidates B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ are elected. Throughout the
counting, since not all of A1, . . . , Aℓ are elected, at least one of them (the first
not yet elected) has a score of at least W/ℓ. Consequently, B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ
are all elected with a score of > W/ℓ. Since only voters from Wc vote for
any Bj , Lemma 9.6(i) applied to {Bj}S+1−ℓ1 yields
V −W = |Wc| > aS+1−ℓW
ℓ
, (9.37)
which is equivalent to
W
V
6
ℓ
ℓ+ aS+1−ℓ
. (9.38)
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Conversely, consider an election with ℓ votes on the list A1 · · ·Aℓ, and
aS+1−ℓ votes on (only) B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ, distributed (using the strategy in
the proof of Lemma 9.6) such that that each Bj is elected with score > 1 if
enough seats are distributed. Then, as long as not all B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ have
been elected, some Bj will have score > 1 (in fact, exactly 1). If A1, . . . , Aℓ−1
have been elected, then Aℓ will have score 1; thus there will be a tie for each
of the remaining seats and it is possible that B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ are elected and
Aℓ not, a bad outcome. This example shows that equality may hold in (9.38)
for a bad outcome, and thus (9.35) holds.
πtactic: Let theW voters inW vote according to the strategy in Lemma 9.6
(and its proof), scaling the number of votes byW/aℓ. Then, using Lemma 9.10,
as long as not all Ai are elected, at least one of them has score > W/aℓ.
Suppose that the outcome is bad. Then, at least S − ℓ+1 other candidates
B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ are elected. Furthermore, throughout the counting, some
Ai has score > W/aℓ; thus every elected candidate, and in particular every
Bj, is elected with score > W/aℓ. Similarly to (9.37), it now follows by
Lemma 9.6(i) that
V −W = |Wc| > aS+1−ℓW
aℓ
, (9.39)
which is equivalent to
W
V
6
aℓ
aℓ + aS+1−ℓ
. (9.40)
Conversely, suppose thatW < aℓ and V = aℓ+aS+1−ℓ, so |Wc| > aS+1−ℓ.
Suppose that the voters inWc vote on B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ (and no others) using
the strategy in Lemma 9.6 and its proof; thus, using also Lemma 9.10, no
matter how the voters in W vote, as long as not B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ are not all
elected, at least one of them will have score > 1. Hence, if the outcome
is good, so A1, . . . , Aℓ all are elected, then each of them has to be elected
with score > 1. However, this contradicts Lemma 9.6(i), since W < aℓ.
Consequently, for such W , the outcome may be bad for any strategy chosen
by W. This and (9.40) yield (9.34).
πwPSC: Suppose that all voters in V vote on lists beginning with A in
some order. Then, by Lemmas 9.9 and 9.10 (and homogeneity), as long as
not all Ai are elected, at least one of them has score > W/cℓ. By the same
argument as just given for πtactic (with aℓ replaced by cℓ), it follows that if
the outcome is bad, then
W
V
6
cℓ
cℓ + aS+1−ℓ
. (9.41)
Conversely, consider an election with V = cℓ + aS+1−ℓ votes; cℓ votes on
A1, . . . , Aℓ distributed as in the extremal case in Lemma 9.9 and its proof,
and aS+1−ℓ votes on B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ distributed according to the strategy
in Lemma 9.6 and its proof. Then, in some round during the counting, not
all Ai have been elected and the leading Ai has score 1; hence all remaining
candidates in A have scores 6 1. Furthermore, unless all Bj already are
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elected (in which case the outcome is bad), at least one of them has score
> 1. Hence, assuming that A loses every time there is a tie, a possible
outcome is that all B1, . . . , BS+1−ℓ are elected before any further Ai, and
thus the outcome is bad. Hence, equality may hold in (9.41) for a bad
outcome, and thus (9.36) holds. 
Corollary 9.12. For Thiele’s ordered method and ℓ = 1: With aS as in
Lemma 9.6,
πTh-otactic(1, S) = π
Th-o
tactic(1, S) = π
Th-o
same(1, S) = π
Th-o
wPSC(1, S) =
1
1 + aS
, S > 1.
(9.42)
Asymptotically, this is ∼ log S/S as S →∞.
Proof. By (9.34)–(9.36), since a1 = c1 = 1; the result for πtactic follows using
(2.3) and (5.2). The asymptotic formula follows from (9.13). 
In particular, Thiele’s ordered method does not satisfy the weak PSC
πwPSC(ℓ, S) < ℓ/S, see Section 8, not even for ℓ = 1 and S large. (In fact,
not for S > 3, as easily follows from (9.36) and Lemma 9.6.) Consequently,
Thiele’s method does not satisfy “Solid coalitions” in [15], see Remark 8.3.
Example 9.13. Since a1 = 1 and a2 = 3/2, Theorem 9.11 yields π
Th-o
tactic(1, 2) =
2/5 and πTh-otactic(2, 2) = 3/5. See Example 9.5, which is the extremal case with
a perturbation to avoid ties. This also shows that no strategy can help the
smaller party in Example 9.5.
Example 9.14. Theorem 9.11 yields πTh-osame(2, 3) = 4/7
.
= 0.571 > 0.5.
Hence, in an election with 3 seats, even if a majority votes for the same list,
they can fail to obtain a majority of the seats. A concrete example (modified
from [24]), which essentially uses the strategy above, is:
55 ABC
30 XY Z
15 Y ZX
A gets the first seat, but then the second and third seats go to X and Y
with 30 votes each. Thus A,X, Y are elected, and the ABC party gets only
1 seat, in spite of a majority of the votes.
10. Borda (scoring) methods
Finally, we consider Borda methods, Appendix A.3.4. Recall than Hn :=∑n
i=1 1/i, the harmonic number.
Theorem 10.1. Let Borda(w) be the Borda method with weights w =
(wk)
∞
1 , and let
wk :=
1
k
k∑
i=1
wi. (10.1)
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Then, for 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
π
Borda(w)
tactic (ℓ, S) =
wS+1−ℓ
wℓ + wS+1−ℓ
, (10.2)
π
Borda(w)
same (ℓ, S) = π
Borda(w)
wPSC (ℓ, S) =
wS+1−ℓ
wℓ + wS+1−ℓ
. (10.3)
In particular, for the harmonic Borda method Borda(1/k): For 1 6 ℓ 6 S,
π
Borda(1/k)
tactic (ℓ, S) =
ℓHS+1−ℓ
(S + 1− ℓ)Hℓ + ℓHS+1−ℓ , (10.4)
π
Borda(1/k)
same (ℓ, S) = π
Borda(1/k)
wPSC (ℓ, S) =
ℓHS+1−ℓ
S + 1− ℓ+ ℓHS+1−ℓ . (10.5)
Furthermore,
π
Borda(1/k)
party (ℓ, S) =
ℓ
S + 1
. (10.6)
Some numerical values for the harmonic Borda method are given in Ta-
bles 11 and 12 in Appendix B.
Proof. It is easy (more or less trivial) to see that Lemmas 9.6(i), 9.9 and
9.10 hold also for Borda(w) with an replaced by 1/wn and cn is replaced by
1/wn.
The result (10.2)–(10.3) then follows by the same proof as for Theo-
rem 9.11, where for πsame we also replace ℓ by 1/wℓ.
For the harmonic case wk = 1/k, we have wk = Hk/k, and (10.4)–(10.5)
follow. Finally, in the party list case, the harmonic Borda method is equiv-
alent to D’Hondt’s method, and thus (10.6) follows from Theorem 4.2. 
Corollary 10.2. For the harmonic Borda method with ℓ = 1:
π
Borda(1/k)
tactic (1, S) = π
Borda(1/k)
tactic (1, S) = π
Borda(1/k)
same (1, S) = π
Borda(1/k)
wPSC (1, S)
=
HS
S +HS
, S > 1. (10.7)
Asymptotically, this is ∼ log S/S as S →∞.
Proof. By (10.4)–(10.5), sinceH1 = 1; the result for πtactic follows using (2.3)
and (5.2). The asymptotic formula follows since HS ∼ logS as S →∞. 
Note that an ∼ Hn/n as n→∞, and thus the asymptotics in, for exam-
ple, Corollaries 9.12 and 10.2 are the same, but exact values differ.
Example 10.3. Since H1 = 1 and H2 = 3/2, π
Borda(1/k)
tactic (1, 2) = 3/7 and
π
Borda(1/k)
tactic (2, 2) = 4/7. Cf. Example 9.13.
Note that the Borda method with weightsw = (1, 0, 0, . . . ) is equivalent to
SNTV; more generally, the Borda method with weights w = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . )
with L 1’s is equivalent to LV(L); in particular, L = S yields BV. Conse-
quently, the results in Theorems 5.4, 5.7 and 5.10 follow from Theorem 10.1.
THRESHOLDS FOR ELECTION METHODS 63
Acknowledgement
This work was partly carried out in spare time during a visit to Churchill
College in Cambridge and the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sci-
ences (EPSCR Grant Number EP/K032208/1), partially supported by a
grant from the Simons foundation, and a grant from the Knut and Alice
Wallenberg Foundation.
I thank Markus Brill for interesting discussions about, in particular, EJR,
JR and PJR, which inspired the present paper.
Appendix A. Election methods
We give here brief descriptions of the election methods discussed above.
For further details, other election methods, political aspects and examples
of actual use, see e.g. [17; 21; 22; 24; 35; 36]. We give also the abbreviation
used in formulas in the present paper.
Note that many election methods are known under several different names.
We give a few synonyms, but omit many others.
A.1. Election methods with party lists. Among the proportional elec-
tion methods, the ones that are most often used are party list methods,
where the voter votes for a party and the seats are distributed among the
parties according to their numbers of votes. (The seats obtained by a party
then are distributed to candidates by some method; many versions are used
in practice.)
Conversely, most (but not all) party list methods that are used in prac-
tice, including the ones below, are proportional, so that each party gets a
proportion of the seats that approximates its proportion of votes.22
Many different list methods are described in detail in e.g. Pukelsheim [36];
see also Balinski and Young [3] for the mathematically (but not politically)
equivalent problem of allocating the seats in the US House of Representatives
proportionally among the states.23
There are two major types of party list methods: divisor methods and
quota methods.
A.1.1. Divisor methods. A divisor method is defined by a sequence d(1), d(2),
d(3) . . . of divisors.24 In the traditional formulation, seats are allocated se-
quentially. For each seat, a party that so far has obtained s seats gets its
number of votes divided by d(s + 1); the party with the highest quotient
22Examples that are not proportional are the divisor methods with divisors d(n) = n0.9
used in Estonia, and d(n) = 2n−1 used in Macau, see [22].
23There, until 1941, the method was decided after each census, so the choice of method
was heavily influenced by its result. Moreover, the number of seats was not fixed in
advance and thus also open to negotiations.
24Warning: Some authors denote our d(n+1) by d(n), thus starting the sequence with
d(0).
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gets the seat.25 The two most important divisor methods are described in
the next subsubsections. They are both of the linear form
d(n) = n− 1 + γ (A.1)
for some constant γ; several other choices of γ (usually but not always with
γ ∈ [0, 1]) have also been used or suggested, for example Adams’s method
with γ = 0, and there are also divisor methods with other (non-linear)
sequences of divisors, see e.g. Footnote 22. We let Div(γ) denote the linear
divisor method given by (A.1); for simplicity we do not consider other divisor
methods (except in Remark 4.4).
A.1.2. D’Hondt’s method (D′H). This is the divisor method with the se-
quence of divisors 1, 2, 3, . . . , i.e. d(n) = n; thus this is the method (A.1)
with γ = 1. It was proposed by Victor D’Hondt in 1878 [10; 11]. D’Hondt’s
method is (almost) equivalent to Jefferson’s method, proposed by Thomas
Jefferson in 1792 for allocating the seats in the US House of Representatives,
see [3].26
A.1.3. Sainte-Lague¨’s method (StL). This is the divisor method with the
sequence of divisors 1, 3, 5, . . . , i.e., d(n) = 2n − 1. Equivalently, we may
take d(n) = n − 1/2; thus this is the method (A.1) with γ = 1/2. The
method was proposed in 1910 by Sainte-Lague¨ [39]. It is (almost) equivalent
to Webster’s method, proposed by Daniel Webster in 1832 for allocating the
seats in the US House of Representatives, see [3].27
A.1.4. Quota methods. In a quota method, first a quota Q is calculated; this
is roughly the number of votes required for each seat, and different quota
methods differ in the choice of Q. The two main quotas that are used are
the Hare quota V/S and the Droop quota V/(S + 1) [13], where V is the
total number of (valid) votes and S is the number of seats (cf. Remark 1.1);
in practice, the quota is often rounded to an integer, either up, or down,
25A different, but equivalent, formulation is that the number of seats for each party
is obtained by selecting a number D and then giving a party with vi votes si > 0 seats
where d(si) 6 vi/D 6 d(si + 1) (with d(0) := 0), where D is chosen such that the total
number of seats given to the parties is S. (This can be regarded as a special rounding
rule used to round vi/D to an integer si.) See Pukelsheim [36] for a details and examples.
Similar formulations have also been used in the United States for allocating the seats in
the House of Representatives to the states [3]. In this version, the number D is called
divisor.
26Jefferson’s method is formulated as in Footnote 25, with rounding downwards, which
is the same as D’Hondt’s method, and nowadays “Jefferson’s method” is used for this
divisor method, equivalent to D’Hondt’s. However, historically this is not quite accurate:
for the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives, the total number was not fixed
in advance but decided by the outcome once a suitable divisor D was chosen by Congress,
which makes the method as used by Jefferson different from D’Hondt’s, where the number
of seats is given in advance.
27 Webster’s method is formulated as in Footnote 25, with rounding to the nearest
integer. However, Footnote 26 applies here too.
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or to the nearest integer (see e.g. [36] and [22] for various examples with
different, or no, rounding). Rounding is mathematically a nuisance, leading
to various problems, but has in practice usually no effect. In the present
paper, we consider the ideal versions without rounding, but see Remark 4.7.
The quota method gives a party with vi votes first ⌊vi/Q⌋ seats; the
remaining seats, if any, are given to the parties with largest remainder in
these divisions. In other words, we find a threshold t ∈ [0, 1] such that we
round vi/Q upwards if the remainder is larger than t. Mathematically, this
means that we find t and integers si (the number of seats for party i) such
that
si − 1 + t 6 vi
Q
6 si + t. (A.2)
The (traditional) description above with remainders assumes that∑
i
⌊vi/Q⌋ 6 S 6
∑
i
⌈vi/Q⌉, (A.3)
and thus that we can find t ∈ [0, 1] such that (A.2) holds and ∑i si = S.
This is always the case with the Hare and Droop quotas, and more generally
with any quota in the interval [V/(S+1), V/S]. (Except a case with ties for
the Droop quota, but then (A.2) still works with t = 1.) Mathematically, the
method works with any quota Q > 0, taking (A.2) as the definition together
with
∑
i si = S and letting t be arbitrary real (and requiring si > 0 with a
modification of (A.2) if t > 1). It is easily shown that if Q > V/(S + 1),
then we can take t 6 1, and if Q 6 V/S, then we can take t > 0.
As said above, there are two main quotas used, and thus two main quota
methods.
A.1.5. Method of largest remainder (Hare’s method) (LR). The quota me-
thod using the Hare quota V/S.
A.1.6. Droop’s method (Droop). The quota method using the Droop quota
V/(S + 1).
A.2. Election methods with unordered ballots. In these methods,
each ballot contains a list of names, but their order is ignored. The number
of candidates on each ballot is, depending on the method, either arbitrary or
limited to at most (or exactly) a given number, for example S, the number
to be elected.
A.2.1. Block Vote (BV). Each voter votes for at most S candidates. The S
candidates with the largest numbers of votes are elected.28 Also called e.g.
Multi-Member Plurality ; Plurality-at-Large.
The special case S = 1 is the widely used Single-Member Plurality me-
thod, also called First-Past-The-Post, where each voter votes for one candi-
date, and the candidate with the largest number of votes wins; this simple
28One version requires each voter to vote for exactly S candidates. For our purposes
this makes no difference, see Remark 5.5.
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method has probably been used since pre-historic times. Block Vote usually
means the multi-member case (S > 2); this too is an ancient method, and
it is widely used in non-political elections. Block Vote is well-known for not
being proportional; when there are organized parties, the largest party will
get all seats, cf. Theorem 5.4.
A.2.2. Approval Vote (AV). Each voter votes for an arbitrary number of
candidates. The S candidates with the largest numbers of votes are elected.
This is also an old method, and has been used, even for public elections,
since the 19th century, although much less frequently than Block Vote.
The method is one of the methods proposed by Thiele [43] in 1895, viz. his
“strong method”, see Appendix A.2.7 below. The method was reinvented
again (and given the name Approval Voting) by Weber c. 1976; see further
e.g. [45; 6; 26].
For our problems, Approval Vote behaves often similarly to Block Vote,
see e.g. Theorem 5.6, but note also the difference in Theorems 6.10 and 6.11.
A.2.3. Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV). Each voter votes for one can-
didate. The S candidates with the largest numbers of votes are elected.
The idea is that a setW of voters can concentrate their votes on a suitable
number of candidates (one or several), according to the size of W, and thus
get these candidates elected. In an ideal situation where all voters belong
to parties and vote as instructed by their party, and, moreover, the parties
accurately know in advance the number of votes for each party, optimal
strategies lead to the same result as D’Hondt’s method, see Theorem 5.7
and [22, Appendix A.8].
However, in practice, there are several practical problems. In particular,
the outcome depends heavily on how the votes are distributed inside the
parties; note that a party can get hurt by too much concentration of votes
as well as by too little concentration. Hence, parties are more or less forced
to use schemes of tactical voting.
A.2.4. Limited Vote (LV, LV(L)). Each voter votes for at most L candidates,
where L is some given number. The S candidates with the largest numbers
of votes are elected.29
Here L 6 S. (Although, formally, this is not necessary, and Approval
Voting in Appendix A.2.2 could be seen as the case L =∞.) The case L = S
is Block Vote, and L = 1 is SNTV, so usually only the case 1 < L < S is
called Limited Vote.
The idea behind Limited Vote is the same as for SNTV, and its problems
are more or less the same, see e.g. [9, p. 193], [12], [17, p. 27].
29As for Block Vote, one version requires each voter to vote for exactly L candidates.
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A.2.5. Cumulative Vote (CV). Each voter can choose between voting for a
single candidate or splitting the vote between two or several. Usually there
are, for practical reasons, limitations on how the votes may be split.30 In
one common version, each voter has a fixed number L votes, and can give
distribute them arbitrarily between one or several (up to L) candidates. In
another version, sometimes called Equal and Even Cumulative Voting, the
voter has one vote that may be given to a single candidate or split between
two or several candidates; this version uses unordered ballots, and a ballot
with n names is counted as 1/n vote for each of them. We let CV= denote
the mathematically ideal version of this, where there is no limitation on the
number of candidates on each ballot. (This version has been reinvented and
called Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) [7].) Another version of Equal
and Even Cumulative Voting, used in practice, allows at most S names on
each ballot.
A.2.6. Phragme´n’s unordered method (Phr-u). Phragme´n’s method for un-
ordered ballots was proposed in 1894 by the Swedish mathematician Phrag-
me´n[31; 32; 33; 34], using several different (but equivalent) formulations.
See [24] for a detailed discussion, including an algorithmic definition. We
use here a description from [34].
The candidates are elected sequentially. When a candidate is elected, the
participating ballots (i.e., the ballots that include this candidate) incur a
total load of 1 unit, which has to be distributed between them. This load
is distributed such that the maximum load on each ballot (inluding loads
from earlier elected candidates) is a small as possible; furthermore, in each
round, the candidate is elected that makes the resulting maximal load on
a ballot as small as possible. (For example, the first elected candidate is
the one that appears on the largest number of ballots; if she appears on m
ballots, these ballots get a load 1/m each.)
The total load when k candidates have been elected is thus k. Note that
the load on a given ballot increases when someone on the ballot is elected,
and otherwise stays the same; it never decreases. We denote the maximum
load when k candidates have been elected by t(k). Thus 0 = t(0) < t(1) 6
t(2) . . . (equalities are possible when there are ties). When k candidates
have been elected, say A1, . . . , Ak in this order, the load on each ballot that
includes Ak is exactly t
(k). More generally, the load on a ballot σ is t(j),
where j := max{i 6 k : Ai ∈ σ}.
A.2.7. Thiele’s optimization method (Th-opt). Let ψ(n) be a given function,
which represents the “satisfication” of a voter that sees n of her candidates
30 An ideal mathematical version, probably never used, is that each voter may give
each candidate i a vote with weight wi > 0, where these weights are arbitrary real numbers
with
∑
i wi = 1.
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elected. Thus the total satisfication if a set E is elected is
Ψ(E) :=
∑
σ∈V
ψ
(|σ ∩ E|), (A.4)
The elected set E is the set with |E| = S that maximizes Ψ(E).
Of course, the method depends on the choice of the satisfaction function f .
It is convenient to write ψ(n) =
∑n
k=1wk for a non-negative sequence w =
(wk)
∞
1 of weights. The standard choice is wk = 1/k and thus ψ(n) = Hn;
this is assumed unless another choice is explicitly mentioned. In particular,
Th-opt always denotes the standard version; we denote the version defined
by another weight sequence w by Th-opt(w).
This method was proposed in 1895 by Thiele [43]. Thiele considered apart
from the standard choice wk = 1/k also the strong method with wk = 1 and
thus ψ(n) = n (which is the same as appoval voting, see Appendix A.2.2)
and the weak method with ψ(n) = 1, n > 1, and thus wk = 0 for k > 2. We
denote the weak method by Th-opt(weak).
Thiele’s optimization method was reinvented in 2001 under the name
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) [26].
Thiele [43] realized that is was computationally difficult to find the opti-
mal set E , and thus proposed also two sequential methods as approximations,
the addition method and the elimination method,31 described in the following
subsubsections.
A.2.8. Thiele’s addition method (Th-add). Candidates are elected one by
one. In each round, the candidate A is elected that maximizes the increase
of the satisfaction (A.4), i.e., Ψ(E∪{A})−Ψ(E), where E is the set of already
elected. (Equivalently, Ψ(E ∪ {A}) is maximized.)
This is thus the greedy version of Thiele’s optimization method. As in
Appendix A.2.7, we assume the standard choice wk = 1/k unless we say
otherwise. Thus Th-add denotes the standard version, the weak version is
denoted Th-add(weak), and the general version with weights w is denoted
Th-add(w).
The standard version can, equivalently but more concretely, be described
by the following rule. (For general weights, 1/(k + 1) is replaced by wk+1.)
Seats are awarded one by one. For each seat, a ballot where k > 0 names
already have been elected is counted as 1/(k + 1) votes for each remaining
candidate on the ballot. The score of a (not yet elected) candidate is the
number of votes for her counted with these weights. The candidate with the
largest score is elected.
Note that the score may change (decrease) from one round to another.
Thiele’s addition method was used in Sweden 1909–1921 for the distribu-
tion of seats within parties, see [24, Appendix D] for details.
31 In Danish: Tilføjelsesreglen and Udskydelsesreglen, respectively. Thiele [43] gave
also the French names re`gle d’addition and re`gle de rejet.
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A.2.9. Thiele’s elimination method (Th-elim). Candidates are eliminated
one by one until only S remain; these are elected. In each round, the candi-
date is eliminated that minimized the decrease in total satisfaction (A.4). In
other words, if the set of candidates is C, we define by backwards recursion
a sequence of subsets Ei for i = |C|, . . . , S (in decreasing order) by E|C| = C
and then letting Ei be the subset of Ei+1 with |Ei| = i that maximizes Ψ(Ei).
We consider only the standard version with weights wk = 1/k. We then
have an equivalent, more explicit, description:
Candidates are eliminated one by one until only S remain; these are
elected. In each round, a ballot where k > 1 names remain is counted as 1/k
votes for each remaining candidate on the ballot. The score of a candidate
is the number of votes for her counted with these weights. The candidate
with the smallest score is eliminated.
The elimination method seems to have been ignored after Thiele’s paper.
It was recently reinvented under the name Harmonic Weighting as a method
for ordering alternatives for the electronic voting system LiquidFeedback [4].
A.3. Election methods with ordered ballots. In these method, each
ballot contains an ordered list of names. The number of candidates on each
ballot is usually arbitrary, but may be limited to at most, or at least, or
exactly some given number, for example S, the number to be elected; some
versions require each voter to rank all candidates. (In the latter case, each
ballot can be seen as a permutation of the set of candidates.)
A.3.1. Single Transferable Vote (STV) (STV). First, a quota is calculated,
nowadays almost always the Droop quota V/(S+1) (usually but not always
rounded to the nearest higher integer), cf. Appendix A.1.4. Each ballot is
counted for its first name only (at later stages, ignoring candidates that have
been elected or eliminated). A candidate whose number of votes is at least
the quota is elected; the surplus, i.e., the ballots exceeding the quota, are
transferred to the next (remaining) name on the ballot. This is repeated
as long as some unelected candidate reaches the quota. If there is no such
candidate, and not enough candidates have been elected, then the candidate
with the least number of votes is eliminated, and the votes for that candidate
are transferred to the next name on the ballot. At the end, if the number of
remaining candidates equals the number of remaining seats, then all these
are elected, even if they have not reached the quota.
This description is far from a complete definition; many details are omit-
ted, and can be filled in in different ways, see e.g. [44], [22], [24, Appendix
E.2]. In particular, several quite different methods are used to transfer the
surplus,32 but some other details can also vary (which might influence the
32 Some versions even involve randomness, e.g. the version of STV used for the lower
house, Da´il, of the Irish parliament, where the outcome may depend on the random order
in which ballots are counted.
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outcome). Thus, STV is a family of election methods rather than a single
method.
A.3.2. Phragme´n’s ordered method (Phr-o). Phragme´n’s method for ordered
ballots was proposed in 1913 by a Swedish Royal Commission (where Phrag-
me´n was one of the members) [19].33 As the version for unordered ballots,
Appendix A.2.6, it can be defined in several different, equivalent ways; see
again [24] for a detailed discussion, including an algorithmic definition.
We use here, as for the unordered version, a definition using loads; the
method is defined as Phragme´n’s unordered method in Appendix A.2.6, with
the added rule that in each round, a ballot is only counted for the first name
on it, ignoring candidates already elected. (For example, the first elected
candidate is the one that is first on the largest number of ballots.)
A.3.3. Thiele’s ordered method (Th-o). Seats are distributed sequentially.
In each round, each ballot is only counted for the first name on it that has
not already been elected; if this is name number k (so the k − 1 preceding
have been elected), then this ballot is counted as a vote with weight 1/k.
To avoid confusion, we use “score” for the total number of votes for a given
candidate, counted with these weights. (Thus the score may change from
one round to another.) In each round, the candidate with the largest score
is elected.
This version of Thiele’s method is not due to Thiele [43], who only consid-
ered unordered ballots (Appendix A.2.7–A.2.8).34 The method was proposed
in 1912 in the Swedish parliament by Nilson in O¨rebro, for distribution of
seats within parties in parliamentary elections; it is discussed (and rejected)
in [19].35
Remark A.1. As for Thiele’s unordered methods (Appendix A.2.7–A.2.8),
an arbitrary given sequence of weights wk could be used instead of 1/k. We
do not consider this possibility in the present paper.
A.3.4. Borda (scoring) methods (Borda(w)). Each ballot is counted as w1
votes for the first name, w2 for the second name, and so on, according to
some given non-increasing sequence w = (wk)
∞
k=1 of non-negative numbers.
The S candidates with highest scores are elected.
Several different sequences (wk)k are used. The method was suggested
(for the election of a single person) by Jean-Charles de Borda in 1770 [5]
with wk = n− k+1 where n is the number of candidates, i.e., the sequence
33 Phragme´n’s ordered method has since 1921 been part of the Swedish election law
(for distribution of seats within parties; nowadays only in a minor role).
34Thus our name for the method is historically incorrect, but we regard it as a version
of Thiele’s addition method for unordered ballots.
35 The method was not adopted for general elections, but it was later chosen, still
within parties, for elections of committees inside city and county councils, and it is still
(formally, at least) used for that purpose, see [22; 24].
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n, n− 1, . . . , 1. (His proposal required each voter to rank all candidates.)36
This scoring rule is called the Borda method ; more generally, any scoring
rule is sometimes called a Borda method.
Another common choice of scoring rule uses the harmonic series, wk =
1/k; we call this the harmonic Borda method. This was proposed in 1857
by Thomas Hare (who later instead developed and proposed STV, Sec-
tion A.3.1). The harmonic Borda method gives in the party-list case (see
Section 4.1) the same result as D’Hondt’s method. However, tactical voting
where the voters of a party vote on the same name in different orders may
give quite different results, cf. Theorem 10.1.
The choice w = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . ) with wk = 1 for k 6 L and wk = 0
for k > L, for some given L > 1, means that only the first L names on
each ballot matter, and that their order is irrelevant; this Borda method is
equivalent to Limited Vote with L names on each ballot, see Appendix A.2.4.
In particular, the weights (1, 0, 0, . . . ) yield SNTV, Appendix A.2.3.
36 The same method was proposed already in 1433 by Nicolas Cusanus for election
of the king (and future emperor, after being crowned by the pope) of the Holy Roman
Empire [29; 20].
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Appendix B. Some numerical values
The tables below give, as illustrations and to faciliate comparisons, nu-
merical values for 1 6 S 6 5 for many of the thresholds discussed in the
paper.
ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 13
.
= 0.333 23
.
= 0.667
3 14 = 0.25
1
2 = 0.5
3
4 = 0.75
4 15 = 0.2
2
5 = 0.4
3
5 = 0.6
4
5 = 0.8
5 16
.
= 0.167 13
.
= 0.333 12 = 0.5
2
3
.
= 0.667 56
.
= 0.833
Table 2. The “optimal” threshold ℓ/(S + 1), attained by
e.g. πD
′H
party, π
Droop
party , π
SNTV
tactic , π
CV
tactic, π
Phr-u
PJR , π
Th-opt
EJR , π
Th-elim
same , π
STV
PSC
(with the Droop quota), πPhr-owPSC. (Theorems 4.2, 4.6, 5.7, 5.13,
7.3, 7.6, 7.26, 8.6, 9.4)
ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 13
.
= 0.333 34 = 0.75
3 14 = 0.25
3
5 = 0.6
5
6
.
= 0.833
4 15 = 0.2
1
2 = 0.5
5
7
.
= 0.714 78 = 0.875
5 16
.
= 0.167 37
.
= 0.429 58 = 0.625
7
9
.
= 0.778 910 = 0.9
Table 3. πStLparty(ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 4.2)
ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 13
.
= 0.333 34 = 0.75
3 14 = 0.25
5
9
.
= 0.556 56
.
= 0.833
4 15 = 0.2
7
16
.
= 0.438 23
.
= 0.667 78 = 0.875
5 16
.
= 0.167 925 = 0.36
11
20 = 0.55
11
15
.
= 0.733 910 = 0.9
Table 4. πLRparty(ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 4.6)
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ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 12 = 0.5
1
2 = 0.5
3 12 = 0.5
3
5 = 0.6
1
2 = 0.5
4 12 = 0.5
4
7
.
= 0.571 35 = 0.6
1
2 = 0.5
5 12 = 0.5
5
9
.
= 0.555 58 = 0.625
3
5 = 0.6
1
2 = 0.5
Table 5. The non-monotone πBVEJR(ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 6.10)
ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 12 = 0.5
2
3
.
= 0.667
3 12 = 0.5
3
5 = 0.6
3
4 = 0.75
4 12 = 0.5
4
7
.
= 0.571 23
.
= 0.667 45 = 0.8
5 12 = 0.5
5
9
.
= 0.555 58 = 0.625
5
7
.
= 0.714 56
.
= 0.833
Table 6. πAVEJR(ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 6.11)
ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 13
.
= 0.333 23
.
= 0.667 ?
3 311
.
= 0.273 12 = 0.5 ?
3
4 = 0.75 ?
4 731
.
= 0.226 37
.
= 0.429 ? 35 = 0.6 ?
4
5 = 0.8 ?
5 ??
.
= 0.193 719
.
= 0.368 ? 917
.
= 0.529 ? 23
.
= 0.667 ? 56
.
= 0.833 ?
Table 7. Known and conjectured values of πTh-addsame (ℓ, S) and
πTh-addPJR (ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 7.8, Conjec-
ture 7.19)
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ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 25 = 0.4
3
5 = 0.6
3 1235
.
= 0.343 12 = 0.5
23
35
.
= 0.657
4 2479
.
= 0.304 1841
.
= 0.439 2341
.
= 0.561 5579
.
= 0.696
5 7202621
.
= 0.275 3691
.
= 0.396 12 = 0.5
55
91
.
= 0.604 19012621
.
= 0.725
Table 8. πTh-otactic(ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 9.11)
ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 25 = 0.4
2
3
.
= 0.667
3 1235
.
= 0.343 47
.
= 0.571 34 = 0.75
4 2479
.
= 0.304 2447
.
= 0.511 23
.
= 0.667 45 = 0.8
5 7202621
.
= 0.275 48103
.
= 0.466 3659
.
= 0.610 811
.
= 0.727 56
.
= 0.833
Table 9. πTh-osame(ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 9.11)
ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 25 = 0.4
2
3
.
= 0.667
3 1235
.
= 0.343 47
.
= 0.571 45 = 0.8
4 2479
.
= 0.304 2447
.
= 0.511 811
.
= 0.727 67
.
= 0.857
5 7202621
.
= 0.275 48103
.
= 0.466 4871
.
= 0.676 45 = 0.8
9
10 = 0.9
Table 10. πTh-owPSC(ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 9.11)
ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 37
.
= 0.429 47
.
= 0.571
3 1129
.
= 0.379 12 = 0.5
18
29 = 0.621
4 2573
.
= 0.342 2249
.
= 0.449 2749
.
= 0.551 4873
.
= 0.657
5 137437
.
= 0.314 2561
.
= 0.410 12 = 0.5
36
61
.
= 0.59 300437
.
= 0.686
Table 11. π
Borda(1/k)
tactic (ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6 S 6 5. (Theorem 10.1)
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ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5
S = 1 12 = 0.5
2 37
.
= 0.429 23
.
= 0.667
3 1129
.
= 0.379 35 = 0.6
3
4 = 0.75
4 2573
.
= 0.342 1120 = 0.55
9
13
.
= 0.692 45 = 0.8
5 137437
.
= 0.314 2549
.
= 0.510 1117
.
= 0.647 34 = 0.75
5
6
.
= 0.833
Table 12. π
Borda(1/k)
same (ℓ, S) = π
Borda(1/k)
wPSC (ℓ, S) for 1 6 ℓ 6
S 6 5. (Theorem 10.1)
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